

THE REACTIVATION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION.

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A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
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fulfillment of the requirement for the
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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ABSTRACT.

THE REACTIVATION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION: An analysis of the role of the Western European Union (WEU) in the formation of a European Pillar within NATO, 1945-88, by Major Patrick F. P. Nopens, Belgium, 168 pages.

Founded in 1954, the WEU soon lapsed into obscurity in the shadow of NATO. In 1984 it was reactivated. The WEU is the only Western European organization mandated to treat security problems outside NATO.

This study uses the US Command and General Staff College's Strategic Analysis Model. However, it supplements it in three ways: a historical overview of NATO and Europe between 1945 and 1988; an analysis of the tensions within NATO; and a study of possible strategies of reform of the transatlantic relationship.

Among the conclusions drawn from this investigation are: the tensions within NATO result from both American impatience about burden sharing and European frustration about "power sharing"; since 1984 the members of the WEU demonstrated a clear will to develop a real forum of security matters; potentially the members of the WEU can create a powerful basis for a European Pillar within NATO; and integration of Western Europe will not be complete until it has drawn up a common defense policy.

The thesis concludes that the WEU is fulfilling its role at present. However, it emphasizes that once all members of the EEC join the organization, the WEU will have outlived its utility as an independent institution.

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MASTER OF MILITARY ARTS AND SCIENCE
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency.
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CHAPTER ONE.

INTRODUCTION.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TOPIC .

The purpose of Western European defense co-operation is to insure that the territorial integrity, political independence and democratic values of participating nations remain secure. Many voices in the United States question the relative burden sharing of its NATO allies toward these values. Some have requested a reduction of the American force levels in Europe. In the face of this possibility, some Europeans have urged increased co-operation in pursuit of a double goal. The first and foremost goal is to persuade the USA to maintain its presence in Europe. The second is to be prepared in case of a partial or complete withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe.

Different organizations focus on European defense co-operation. All of them support the creation of a European Pillar within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Western European Union (WEU) is only one of the

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organizations which could form the basis of a common European security system. The Eurogroup and the Independent European Programme Group attempt this within NATO.

This thesis singles out the WEU as the only existing European organization mandated to treat security problems outside the framework of NATO.¹ Therefore, it is a natural choice for a security organization extending the political and economic institutions of an integrated Western Europe. This could be done without the participation of Europe's transatlantic allies or as a true European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. In this context the revival of the WEU could become an important factor in the future of transatlantic relations.

Thus, this thesis attempts to answer the following research question: "Could the reactivation of the West European Union pave the way for a European Pillar within the Atlantic Alliance?"

¹ The founding members of the WEU are the original signatories of the Brussels Treaty: France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and joined by Federal German Republic and Italy. On 14 November 1988, Spain and Portugal were admitted as members. All the members of the WEU belong to NATO. In addition to the USA and Canada, excluded NATO members are Denmark, Norway, Ireland, Turkey and Greece.

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BACKGROUND .

Since 1945, there have been many attempts to create a unified Europe.² Economic unification has met with a substantial degree of success.³ Political co-operation has not been as spectacular as the economic one. However, it is slowly taking shape in the wake of the European Economic Community (EEC).⁴ The greatest weakness in constructing a unified Europe has been the lack of a truly European security dimension. The failures or semi-failures encountered when it comes to responding to the requirements of European security in other (European) institutions, explain the initiatives attempting to reactivate the WEU.⁵

In 1948 Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom signed the Brussels Treaty out of

² Chapters two and five respectively describe the WEU's establishment and the period up to 1984 in detail.

³ 1992 should see the adoption of one single European market. All trade barriers between the EEC's members are supposed to be abolished by then.

⁴ The European Economic Community was established by the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957. It came into force on 1 January 1958. Originally it consisted of The BENELUX, France, the FRG and Italy. In 1973 the UK, the Republic of Ireland and Denmark joined to be followed in 1981 by Greece and in 1987 by Spain and Portugal. The Treaty of Rome's main function is economic and does not provide for a common foreign nor security policy between the members.

⁵ Union de l'Europe Occidentale, Assemblée, Rapport d'Information (1986): p. 16.

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concern for security. This treaty resulted not only from the Soviet threat but also, and not in the least, from fear of an eventual rearmament of Germany.

In 1952, the signatories of the Brussels Treaty elaborated a scheme to form a European Defense Community. A supranational West European defense force would supervise West German rearmament. The signatories invited the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), founded in 1949, to join. This plan eventually ran into opposition in France.

Following the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954, the Paris agreements modified the Brussels Treaty on 23 October 1954. This gave birth to the WEU, including Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany in the collective defense of Europe. At the same time the FRG and Italy joined NATO.

With the United States as the dominant NATO partner and the FRG as a trusted ally, the WEU lost its momentum. It lapsed into obscurity and for thirty years performed some routine tasks in the shadow of NATO. In 1984 the "Declaration of Rome" put it forward as the forum for expressing a more unified European position within NATO.

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In October 1987 the seven members agreed to a "Platform on European Security Interests". This initiative re-launched the WEU as the medium of a Western European dimension of security.⁶ In November 1988 Spain and Portugal joined the WEU.

The reactivation has to be seen in the context of the European integration on the one hand and of Atlantic solidarity on the other hand. It is a reflection of West Europe's desire to form the basis of a European pillar of NATO. This should not only strengthen NATO but also enlarge Europe's contribution and influence in Alliance affairs. Moreover, it also marks the beginning of a true interest by some members of the European Economic Community for its security dimension.

The following paragraphs will define the concepts of a West European security dimension and of a European pillar of NATO.

⁶ The concept of "West European Security Dimension" as it is used in this thesis is defined on p. 6.

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WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY DIMENSION .

The ultimate goal of the European Economic Community is the creation of a European Union.⁷ Within the unification process of Western Europe there are different dimensions: the economic, political and security dimension are the most important.

The West European security dimension, in this thesis, relates to the interest (or rather, the lack of it) in security matters within Western Europe. Western Europe is integrating with varying degrees of success economically and politically. However, it does not seem to be able to define a common foreign and security policy.⁸

⁷ Article 2 of the Platform on European Security Interests, signed by the members of the WEU on 27 October 1987 in The Hague, underlines this aspect:

We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.

⁸ The European Economic Community (EEC) is the motor of economic integration and is relatively successful. The European Political Co-operation (EPC) attempts to harmonize the foreign policy of the twelve members of the EEC. The EPC does, however, only have competence to treat economic and political aspects of security.

INTRODUCTION

From a more general point of view there certainly is a European security dimension. This is identifiable with any problem related to security in a general European context. This will rather be referred to as the 'European security context'.

It is not easy to predict in what measure Western Europe will play a more important role in its own security in the near future. Two factors do, however, stimulate a greater likelihood of West European defense co-operation. The state of transatlantic relations is tense. Also, recent years have witnessed a new interest in foreign and security policies within the Common Market. However, one should not expect sudden and great progress in this field.

The merit of the WEU is twofold. It has survived years of neglect of a European common approach to security issues and has participated in the awakening of a common interest in these matters.

EUROPEAN PILLAR .

The most recent publication of the Eurogroup describes the notion of a European Pillar in a metaphor. It expresses the way Atlanticist Europeans view the Alliance:

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The Alliance is often likened to a bridge spanning the Atlantic and supported on twin pillars, Europe and North America. If the structure as a whole is to remain sound, the two pillars must remain strong and evenly matched.⁹

The concept of a European pillar in NATO is not a new one. On 4 July 1962 President Kennedy declared that he did not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival.¹⁰ Nor is it necessarily considered as a threat to the American position in the Alliance. Senator Albert Gore Jr., in a speech to the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in November 1988 said:

A bigger, more fully integrated European defense establishment would certainly be tough-minded in pursuit of its interests, but it would also be more capable and efficient.

Any such improvement in efficiency can come none too quickly.¹¹

The notion of a European pillar has three important components.

⁹ Eurogroup. Western Defense: The European Role in NATO (1988): p. 4.

¹⁰ For an American view in the 1960s on a united Western Europe making a greater contribution and playing a more important role in the Alliance see p. 99 below.

¹¹ Albert Gore, "US, West Europe Roles in NATO Future," ROA National Security Report 1 (January 1989): p. 15.

INTRODUCTION

- * European unity, defining a common European security policy and strengthening the Alliance, giving it a better balance.

- * Through a better balanced Alliance, acceptance as equal partners by the U.S.

- * In the transatlantic debate, representing one unified European point of view, reducing the number of European voices from fourteen to one single "pillar".

To become effective, a European Pillar has to be more than the sum of national resources. It implies far reaching co-operation which is not subordinate to national interests. A supranational organization, having effective power in its own right, should guide this collaboration.

The concept of European Pillar within NATO supposes the continuation of the Alliance. There are, however, voices contending that the Atlantic Alliance has outlived its utility. This is doubtful. However, the relative position of the different partners has undergone major changes since the establishment of NATO. On the other hand, the Alliance has hardly adjusted to this evolution. These changing conditions in the transatlantic relationship drive the following assumptions.

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ASSUMPTIONS .

The thesis is built on the following assumptions

* The future will witness important changes in the present Atlantic order. The Atlantic Alliance is being subjected to a transformation because the relative strength and/or interest of the US in Europe is diminishing.¹²

* This evolution will lead to greater European integration. This narrows down the range of alternatives to models containing European integration. It does not consider fragmentation or drastic realignment of alliances.

* " Western European countries acquiesce in a sustained withdrawal of US forces, but will be anxious to maintain NATO in some form."¹³

* There will be no drastic change in the assessment of the Soviet threat by Western Europe. In this matter, no disconnects will develop between the perceptions of the more

¹² For the shift in interests of the USA, some calling for radical adjustments, see the Report of the Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence (1988).

¹³ Alistair Buchan, Europe's Futures, Europe's Choices (1969): p. 14.

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conservative and neutralistic European countries.

* "The countries of Eastern Europe will not be anxious to abrogate the Warsaw Pact, whatever their differences with Moscow."¹⁴ This is chiefly due to fear of German domination.

* The choice among the different strategies of reform will not remain merely academic but will consist of realizable alternatives. The West Europeans will thus have a certain freedom of action. This supposes a certain will to shape the evolution of Europe and not solely to undergo the actions of the superpowers.

STRATEGIES OF REFORM .

Different approaches exist as to the future of the security of Western Europe.

Therefore, for the sake of completeness, this thesis will examine different strategies of reform of the Atlantic relationship. Some do not reflect Atlantic solidarity. Others do to a more or lesser degree. All, however, are based on a growing European integration.

¹⁴ Ibid.

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This thesis examines four possible strategies of reform of European co-operation and Atlantic relations.¹⁵

Atlantic reformism is the strategy where the WEU or another organization forms the European pillar of NATO for a better balanced Alliance. This would create a benign but balanced partnership. The Europeans would increase their input while getting a greater say in Alliance affairs.

European reformism focuses on intensifying intra-European collaboration, but without facing up to diverging European and American interests. It assumes a stronger European Community which would have a greater say in Alliance affairs, while avoiding confrontation. Atlantic reformism actively pursues an outspoken Atlantic approach to security problems. European reformists are reluctant to make a formal choice between an "Atlantic" and a purely European collective security system.

Belief in the incompatibility of American and European interests is the foundation of European "Gaullism".

¹⁵ This classification of different strategies of reform draws particularly on John Palmer, Europe without America? The Crises in Atlantic Relations (1987). This provocative analysis of the European-American relationship examines possible alternatives for collective security for Western Europe. Not all readers will agree with Palmer's conclusion that a non-aligned socialist Western Europe is a viable option. Nevertheless, his book remains well-worth reading. The different strategies of reform are treated on pp. 164-192.

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It would combine a protected market-oriented Community with a more aggressive affirmation of a Western European identity. European Gaullists combine a greater economic and security independence from the U.S.A. with a militant attitude towards the Warsaw Pact.

Some Socialists propose a non-aligned (socialist) Europe. Their ideas have undergone strong influences from the ecological and peace movements. This concept draws on two factors. First, a "dawn in the East" would provoke a similar detachment by the Eastern European countries from the Soviet Union. Moreover, certain evidence points toward an opportunity for Europe to overcome its present lethargy and eventually unite Eastern and Western Europe.

After these four strategies of reform, the thesis then focuses on exploring "Atlantic reformism", where a more united Europe establishes a European pillar within an Atlantic framework.

LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS .

This paper only uses English, Dutch and French language sources. It only considers material published before 1 March 1989.

INTRODUCTION

The thesis does not address how to reform or how to structure a European security organization. It focuses on four points:

- * It describes the existing institutions of the WEU.
- * It assesses the major players on the Western European scene.
- * It analyses the revival of the organization.
- * It examines as to how far a revived WEU can effectively contribute to a European pillar in NATO.

To answer the research question, it will attempt to answer the following questions:

- * Is the revival of the WEU expected to continue?
- * Does the reactivated WEU have the necessary tools at its disposal to effectively contribute to the formation of a European Pillar within NATO?
- * Is it likely that the political will of Western Europe to develop a common security dimension will gain enough impetus to effectively define one and carry it out?

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* Is it likely that in the near future, the WEU's role will be transferred from the WEU to another European or NATO organization.

* As the compositions of the WEU, EEC and NATO are not identical, (1) can the WEU speak in name of all European members of NATO and (2) can an Atlanticist security policy be adopted by all members of the EEC?

REVIEW OF LITERATURE .

For events up to 1987, the thesis draws on books and periodicals studying NATO and US-European (bi- or multilateral) relations.

Periodicals and WEU official documents provide insight since the "Platform on European Security Interests." Footnotes throughout the thesis include elements of the review of literature.

METHODOLOGY .

The US Army Command and General Staff College's strategic analysis model provides the base of the overall methodology.¹⁶ The CGSC strategic analysis model is a

¹⁶ US Army, Command and General Staff College, CGSC P511, Joint and Combined Environments (1988): p. 27-30.

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general approach to the analysis of a strategic problem which has been developed over the past several years at the United States Army Command and General Staff College. It comprises five steps:

- Stating the problem and the assumptions.
- Identifying relevant actors and interests.
- Assessing each actor's power and interests.
- Developing policy options.
- Conclusions and recommendations.

This thesis uses the prospective model to provide the scenarios.¹⁷ Future oriented studies usually use one of two methodologies. The first one uses extrapolation of data from the past, the second one uses mainly empirical instruments. The second one, the "prospective" school uses data collection and extrapolation in the first stage. It does, however, declare a clear choice between different scenarios. The danger of this system is that it emphasizes wishful thinking. Also the chosen scenario's should constantly be confronted with reality if one does not want it to become ideology. Therefore, to avoid these pitfalls, it was

¹⁷ The following paragraph is based on Ferdinand Kinski, "A European Defense System: Proposals for Restructuring NATO," in Robert J. Jackson, ed., Continuity and Discord. Crises and responses in the Atlantic Community (1985): pp. 135-136.

INTRODUCTION

necessary to include a chapter examining different strategies of reform of the present Atlantic order.

An historical overview of the events leading to the founding of the WEU and of its activities during its "dormant" years places the WEU in its context.

THESIS OUTLINE .

Chapter one introduces the subject and deals with the first step of the CGSC strategic analysis model.

Chapter two describes the historical background leading to the establishing of the WEU.

Chapter three follows steps two and three of the strategic analysis model. It identifies the major players as France, the Federal German Republic, the United Kingdom, Italy, the BENELUX, Spain and Portugal. One cannot examine the West European security context without, however, taking its two major players into account. Therefore, this chapter also analyzes the interests and the influence of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. It then assesses each actor's power to pursue its identified interests.

The revival of the WEU has many reasons. Chapter four deals with the current problems within the Atlantic Alliance. It gives an overview of the evolution of

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transatlantic relations over the last forty years. It identifies tensions and groups them into three categories: persistent differences between European and American members of the organization, the challenge to American economic preponderance and the end of West European indifference to defense problems. It also ascertains that the USA, while continuing its commitment to Europe, is increasingly turning its attention to other parts of the world.

Chapter five describes the dormant years of the WEU and the initiatives taken outside the organization during this period.

Chapter six describes the reactivation in detail from 1984 onwards. This culminated in the "Platform on European Security Interest" in 1987 and the admission of Spain and Portugal in 1988.

Chapter seven examines strategies of reform proposed earlier on. It includes step four of the CGSC strategic analysis model. It addresses European reformism, Neo-Gaullism and non-alignment. It then focuses on Atlantic reformism to try to determine what chances the WEU has in establishing a European pillar within NATO.

INTRODUCTION

Chapter eight reaches the conclusions, makes recommendations and forms the fifth step of the analysis. The recommendations are limited to pointing out possible fields for further research.

CHAPTER TWO.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

INTRODUCTION .

The Western European Union was founded in 1954. It developed from the Brussels Treaty Organization. This chapter describes the evolution of European aspirations to develop a more closely coordinated defense effort. It spans the era from the Second World War until the establishment of the WEU.

As significant steps in the prelude to the Western European Union, this chapter briefly explores the Dunkirk Treaty and the Brussels Treaty Organization. Then, it mentions the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and examines the failure of the European defense Community.

Finally, after looking into the establishment of the WEU in more detail, it examines its institutions.¹

¹ The analysis of the different treaties and organizations draws heavily on Political and Economic Planning, European Organizations (1961): pp. 207-228.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE DUNKIRK TREATY .

Late in the Second World War Great Britain insisted on an occupation zone for France in Germany. The United Kingdom wanted to prevent being the only power facing the Russians in Germany when the US troops went home.² Historically, this act can be viewed as the beginning of a European defense co-operation.

In 1947 the United Kingdom and France signed the Treaty of Dunkirk. The main aim of this treaty of alliance and mutual assistance was to resist any revival of German aggression. It also provided for both parties to hold regular consultations on economic matters and to take common action in case Germany would fail to fulfil its economic obligations.

THE BRUSSELS TREATY .

In 1948 France and Great Britain extended their collaboration. On 17 March Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands joined them in signing the Brussels Treaty. The

² Trevor Taylor, European Defence Cooperation (1984): p. 15.

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Treaty not only provided for automatic mutual assistance in event of an "armed attack in Europe,"³ but it also promoted economic, social and cultural co-operation.

The Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) established a permanent machinery for consultation. The Consultative Council of Foreign Ministers was to be the supreme organ. A permanent commission acted on the Council's behalf when it was not in session.

The Defense Organization worked under direction of the Consultative Council. It consisted of the Defense Committee, the Supply Quantity Board and the Western European Commander-in-Chief Committee. In this way it devised a suitable organizational structure to allow it to engage in defense planning.

The Brussels Treaty came about as a result of the mounting tension between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. Even so, it was also intended as a bulwark against the revival of German military power. The preamble stipulates explicitly that its members must "take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression."

³ Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty.

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Article IX allows "any other state to accede" by agreement of all members. The BTO can be considered as the fore-runner of NATO. It is significant that on the very day that the Brussels Treaty was signed, President Truman heralded the necessity of a Atlantic version of the treaty.⁴

The Brussels Treaty was not only a military alliance. The Preamble shows quite clearly that it was supposed to be part of a larger framework of European unity:

to strengthen ... the economic, social and cultural ties...to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe⁵ a firm basis for European economic recovery.

Yet, very soon the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) lost practically all its major reasons of existence. Due to the simultaneous development of the Organization for European Economic Co-Operation, it never took up its economic responsibilities.⁶ When on 4 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, the BTO also lost

⁴ Alfred Cahen, "Unity Through Common Defence-Western European Union," NATO's Sixteen Nations (June 1986): p. 39.

⁵ Chatham House Study Group, Atlantic Alliance (1979): p. 151.

⁶ The Organization for European Economic Co-operation was established only one month after the signing of the Brussels Treaty. It was comprised of all Western European countries with the exception of Spain. Canada and the United States became associate members in 1950. It is not a fore-runner of the European Common Market: its task was to undertake a recovery program in Europe.

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its military role. The only role left to the organization was as a coordination body for social and cultural affairs.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY .

Different events stimulated the expansion of the Brussels Treaty Organization into a transatlantic alliance. The Soviet Union had rapidly extended its sphere of influence over Eastern Europe, Eastern Germany and the Balkans and was blockading Berlin. It was also threatening Greece, Turkey and Iran. The Soviet Union systematically used its right to veto in the United Nations. Its unwillingness to participate in arms limitations had quickly alienated it from its former allies. The Americans were convinced that the recovery of Europe could not be achieved successfully in this atmosphere of insecurity.

All these events led the USA to take a more active part in international affairs and to commit itself formally to the defense of Western Europe. The Vandenberg Resolution, introduced on 19 May 1948 in the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, paved the way for military assistance to regional alliances.

The NATO Treaty was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. From an American point of view, an Atlantic alliance

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enhanced its own security position. The USA, in its new role as leader of the Western World, could not allow Soviet hegemony over the whole of Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty formed the framework of a defensive alliance: article V of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that the signatories "...would regard an attack on any of their number, in Europe or in North America as an "attack against them all." The article further states that each of them should:

assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other parties, such actions it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

This constitutes a major difference with the Brussels Treaty. In the BTO, the members committed themselves to automatic and immediate military assistance in case of aggression against another member. The North Atlantic Treaty does not oblige its signatories to react with military force.

The shape of the BTO's military organization influenced the configuration of NATO. The Atlantic Alliance established five regional planning groups to work out detailed plans of defense for their respective region. One of these regions was the area covered by the five Brussels

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Treaty powers.

Initially, the birth of NATO did by no means cause a sudden substantial increase of American troop-levels in Europe. It was only when the outbreak of the Korean War was perceived by many Washington planners as a diversion effort for Soviet aggression in Europe, that the Americans contemplated expanding their troop-level in Europe. They did, however, demand a more important European defense effort. The most effective way to achieve this was to involve the Federal Republic of Germany in the defense of Western Europe. This required intense diplomatic maneuvering during the following years.

THE REJECTION OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY .

From 1950 to 1954 Western Europeans made serious efforts to collaborate more intimately in security matters. Their goal was to form a European Defense Community (EDC) within NATO.

The French Prime Minister Pleven called for the establishment of a defense community by the members of the Brussels Treaty. This community would act within the larger framework of the North Atlantic Alliance.

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In the first place his plan was a counter-proposal to an American demand for immediate rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany after the outbreak of the Korean war.⁷ The US proposed a deal. The Europeans would accept the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany and its adherence to NATO. The USA would greatly increase the number of troops in Europe under an American Commander-in-Chief.⁸

Some Europeans, and in particular the French, were reluctant to see the Germans rearming as a sovereign state. The French Prime Minister Pleven invited the Federal Republic of Germany to join a defense community and to participate in a supra-national West European army. The FRG would not become a member of NATO. The West Germans would, however, participate in the defense of Western Europe within the confines of this European Army. This was to consist of some

⁷ The Federal Republic of Germany had been established in 1949 after it became clear that the Soviet occupation zone of Germany would not be allowed to join the American, British and French zones after ending the occupation. The occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany was formally ended in 1954.

⁸ An extensive study of the German rearmament question and its link with European political unification can be found in Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question, American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II (1971). This book explores the American insistence on a German participation in the defense of Western Europe and the political maneuvering which resulted.

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fifty divisions and 4000 aircraft. The West Germans were to be integrated in this European army at the brigade level. In this way, if they withdrew to form their own national army to attack France at a later date, there would be ample notice.

This idea was accepted by the French National Assembly in October 1950.⁹ On 27 May 1952, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy signed the European Defense Community treaty. The United Kingdom did not join.

The EDC would establish a centralized procurement system. A council operating on majority voting basis would exercise parliamentary control over a Board of Commissioners. This Board would supervise a common budget. The Federal Republic of Germany would regain its sovereignty upon ratification of the Treaty.

The USA backed this scheme. It desired a certain degree of European unity. The Americans demanded the reintegration and rearmament of Western Germany at a time that the Korean war made the Soviet threat very concrete.

⁹ Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (1959): pp. 24-25.

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The United Kingdom continued to decline joining the EDC. It did commit itself, however, to station substantial numbers of troops on the Continent to reassure France that Western Germany would not be allowed to dominate the EDC.

The EDC failed, however, to come into being for different reasons.

First of all, the French kept lagging in their attempts to ratify the Treaty. Robert McGeehan contends that the purpose of the Pleven Plan was to delay indefinitely German rearmament. The French insisted a German Army would only be acceptable in an integrated European Force, responsible to a unified European political authority.¹⁰ By 1952 the Plan had developed into a variant whereby the creation of the defense force would precede the formation of a European political unification. This was unacceptable for France. It would restore German sovereignty and rearm the Federal Republic of Germany without any control by a supranational institution.

A second factor was that the United Kingdom did not want to get involved in a scheme which would make it surrender sovereignty. France wanted the UK as a political counterweight to Germany and as a military guarantor.

¹⁰ Robert McGeehan, "European Defence Cooperation: A Political Perspective," The World Today 41 (June 1985): p. 116.

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Britain's refusal to participate contributed to France's unwillingness to ratify the treaty. The BENELUX countries also wanted the UK to participate in order to avoid a French-German directorate.

Thirdly, after the end of the Korean war and Stalin's death, the Soviet menace did not seem as imminent. The French National Assembly ultimately defeated the EDC on 29 August 1954. The French failed to ratify it because of increasing Gaullist and Communist influence in that body. The Gaullists were not prepared to relinquish national sovereignty in the face of a reemerging Germany and a UK which did not want to commit itself. From the beginning, the Soviets had been deeply concerned about a plan for a European defense Community. They had waged a vigorous peace campaign throughout 1954-55. The French Communists followed the Moscow line faithfully.¹¹

After the French National Assembly had rejected its ratification, the EDC was doomed to failure together with the proposed European Political Community which had arisen in its wake.¹²

The experience of the abortive EDC gives rise to an

¹¹ Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future, Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain (1985): p. 26.

¹² Taylor, European Defence Cooperation: p. 16.

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important question. What is the role of integration in the field of defense for a united Europe? Can a European Defence Community be established before there is a political structure to match it? Or can an integration in the defense field act as a catalyst in the general integration of Western Europe?.¹³

THE ESTABLISHING OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION .

After the rebuff of the EDC, the Europeans and the Americans were anxious to find a way of incorporating the Federal Republic of Germany in the Atlantic defense system. The UK decided it had to act swiftly to forestall an American disengagement from Europe. The American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had indeed spoken of an "agonizing reappraisal" of the US commitment to Europe.¹⁴

The British Prime Minister Anthony Eden had to overcome French unwillingness to accept German sovereignty and rearmament, even in the framework of NATO. He decided that this could best be done by adapting the Brussels

¹³ Alistair Buchan, Europe's Futures, Europe's Choices (1969): p. 96.

¹⁴ Robert Hunter, Security in Europe (1972): p. 144.

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Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would join the Brussels Treaty.

The British would provide a long-term commitment to European defense: they would station important and specified numbers of forces on the continent to counterbalance any possibility of German domination. This commitment corresponded with Britain's strategic needs at the time.¹⁵

This British proposal was agreed upon at the London Conference in February 1954. A series of protocols signed in Paris on 23 October 1954, modified the Brussels Treaty and renamed it the Western European Union.¹⁶ The most important results of the Paris Agreements were:

- * The establishment of the Western European Union as a successor to the Brussels Treaty Organization;
- * The inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy as members;
- * The incorporation of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO;
- * A specific British commitment to station armed

¹⁵ Political and Economic Planning, European Organizations: p. 344.

¹⁶ The day before, the Four-Power Conference attended by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and United States of America, terminated the occupation regime in Western Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany regained full sovereign status effective 5 May 1955.

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forces on the continent of Europe;

* A Franco-German agreement on the Saar.

The Treaty made no references to German aggression.

The Paris agreements consist of a preamble and four protocols relevant to the formation of the WEU.

The preamble stresses that the Western European Union not only seeks to promote defense co-operation but also to further political integration of Western Europe.

The first Protocol establishes the Council of Western European Union.¹⁷ It amends the Brussels Treaty to permit the entry of the FRG and of Italy into the WEU.

The second protocol assigns the MAXIMUM forces which each member can station on the Continent. For the UK it provides a commitment to maintain four divisions and a tactical air force, or the equivalent. This obligation lasts until 1998. From a military point of view this commitment was nothing new. Britain has maintained substantial forces on the Mainland since 1944. It was, nevertheless, a significant change in the foreign policy of the United Kingdom. For the first time it committed itself formally to stationing troops in peacetime on the Continent.

The third protocol provides resolutions on the

¹⁷ For a more detailed examination of the institutions of the Western European Union see p. 37 below.

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control of armaments on the European continent. The FRG undertakes not to produce any NBC weapons or long-range missiles, strategic bombers or large warships without the agreement of a two-thirds majority of the Council.

The fourth protocol enforces the provision of the third protocol. It provides for the creation of an Agency for Control of Armaments. This Agency has a double function. First, it controls through inspection the level of stocks of those armaments which the several countries are permitted to manufacture. Second, it discriminates against the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁸ It satisfies itself of the observance by the Federal Republic of Germany of the prohibition to produce certain categories of weapons.¹⁹ It is to the advantage of the United Kingdom which is not open to inspection by the Agency, which is confined to the Mainland. The only control exercised by the WEU over the UK is related to the level of its forces committed to the Continent and their armaments.

¹⁸ The Federal Republic of Germany is the only member forbidden to produce NBC weapons and certain other weapons. These restrictions have been lifted. Cfr. below, Chapter Two, footnote 7, 26.

¹⁹ Protocol II, Article 5.

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The Western European Union created a parliamentary assembly to discuss all facets of European defense. It provides for expanded powers to the Council. It nevertheless accepts that the North Atlantic Council is the proper forum to discuss strategic planning and defense policies.²⁰

Article IV of the Treaty states clearly that:

...any organs established ...shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

The Western European Union does not control forces of its own nor does it have a command structure to do so. A resolution by the North Atlantic Council included in the Paris Agreements accepts the WEU as part of the NATO defense system.²¹ It states that all forces in the area of Allied Command Europe should be placed under authority of the appropriate NATO Command. All members are allowed forces for the defense of overseas territories and the national

²⁰ The relation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union is formalized in Article IV of the Paris Agreements.

²¹ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Britain in Western Europe. WEU and the Atlantic Alliance (1978, c1956): p. 67.

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territory. No country can have armed forces in Western Europe or redeploy them without authorization of NATO. Interesting today is the passage dealing with the integration of forces. The resolution decided to maintain integration at Army Group and Tactical Air Force level. However, if conditions were favorable, integration at a lower level could be carried out.²²

Like the BTO, the Western European Union obliges its members to come to each others help with military force if one of them is attacked. The automatic military assistance obligation of the Western European Union Treaty was is more binding than the reaction imposed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.²³ Article IV of the Paris agreements states that:

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

Nevertheless, the importance of the military co-operation achieved within NATO was in practice much greater.

²² Ibid., pp. 67-68.

²³ Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, see above p. 23, 35.

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THE INSTITUTIONS .

Four important institutions form the tools of the Western European Union: the Council, the Assembly, the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA), the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC).




Fig. 1

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The powers of the Council which existed under the BTO were expanded by the WEU. It is, however, a somewhat anomalous organization.²⁴ On the one hand it has unlimited responsibilities (Article VIII). On the other hand, Article IV limits its military responsibilities by requiring it to rely on NATO for information and advice. The Council is the executive and policy-making organ of the Western European Union. Representatives of ambassadorial rank meet regularly in London. Ministers of Foreign Affairs meet in irregular sessions.

There are different voting procedures depending on the subject. Increase of forces must be approved unanimously; extension of types of armament (other than NBC) to the Federal Republic of Germany by a two thirds majority.²⁵ Most other decisions require a majority vote which is binding for its members.

²⁴ Christopher Coker, "The Western European Union and European Security," in Robert J. Jackson, ed., Crises and Responses in the Atlantic Community (1985): p. 158.

²⁵ Subsequent different agreements relaxed the restrictions on the FRG:

- 1962: submarines from 350 to 450 tons.
- 1963: submarines from 450 to 1000 tons.
- 1980: all restrictions on size of West German warships.
- 1984: all remaining restrictions except those on NBC weapons.

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


Fig. 2

The WEU added The Assembly to the makeup of the BTO. It is a consultative assembly of parliamentarians. It consists of eighty-nine members, eighteen from each the United Kingdom, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, seven each from the Netherlands and Belgium and three from Luxembourg.²⁶ Until 1987 the Assembly had six permanent

²⁶ The number of parliamentarians to be allocated to Spain and Portugal is still under discussion.

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committees: the Committee of Defense Questions and Armaments, the Committee on Rules of Procedures and Privileges, the Political Affairs Committee, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, the Committee on Parliamentary Relations and the Committee on Science, Technology and Aerospace. It has a budget and a secretariat of its own.²⁷

The International Secretariat is split in two separate parts:

- * The Secretariat of the ministerial organs headed by the Secretary-General is located in London. It has a section in Paris serving the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

- * The Secretariat of the Assembly is directed by the Clerk.

The main duty of The Agency for the Control of Armaments is to control the execution of the limitations imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany. It also establishes the existing stocks of the weapons or systems on the continent. Each country must make an annual report expressing the necessary equipment and the actual stocks

²⁷ For the adapted organization, see p. 109 below.

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held on the continent. The Agency verifies these through inspections. As mentioned earlier, there is a positive discrimination in favour the United Kingdom which is not subjected to control by the Agency.

The Standing Armaments Committee (ACA) has representatives of the seven members and is based in Paris.²⁸ Its main mission is to seek closer collaboration between Western European countries in arms manufacturing and standardization. The reasons were not merely of a purely economic or military nature. France hoped by instituting a really European arms industry, it would be impossible for Germany to rebuild its own independent armament industry in a short time.

When the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) was established in 1976, it largely took over the tasks of the ACA. The ACA's only remaining function is control of non-conventional (especially NBC) weapons production on the European continent.

²⁸ Originally to be able to work closely with NATO, then at Fountainbleau.

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CONCLUSION.

The WEU was not set up for any immediate military reason. It was rather the American insistence to integrate the FRG in the Western defense system which lay at the base of its conception. This short overview of the events leading up to the establishment of the WEU clearly demonstrates the complex character of the European security context in the aftermath of two World Wars.

The next chapter examines the major actors, their interests and elements of power and how the different actors view the European security context. This examination will allow for a better insight in the role the WEU could have in the establishing of a European Pillar of NATO.

CHAPTER THREE.

RELEVANT ACTORS.

INTRODUCTION.

This chapter develops steps two and three of the CGSC strategic analysis model.¹

In step two it will identify those key actors that have an interest in Europe. Once the different actors and their interests are identified, their significance and their relationships will be examined to recognize complementary and conflicting interests.

Step three will assess each actor's power to pursue its interests. It evaluates the following elements of power: political, economic and geographic power as well as national will.

¹ For a short overview of the CGSC Strategic Analysis Model see p. 15 above. For a more detailed outline see US Army, Command and General Staff College, CGSC P 511, Joint and Combined Environment (1988): pp. 27-30.

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The obvious relevant actors are the members of the WEU. Beyond that, the USA and the USSR have vested interests and objectives that might conflict with or complement those of the Western European Union's. Within the WEU, the national interests of each separate state will be considered as well as the common interests of the Organization. This chapter also considers the potential power of the WEU countries as a whole and the relative share of each member. Through studying each actor's long term goals and its past experience, the chapter examines each actor's attitude towards a West European pillar of NATO.

In line with step three of the analysis model, each actor's potential to pursue its interests is assessed. The actors are not examined separately but a set of statistics compares their elements of power.

RELEVANT ACTORS AND INTERESTS.

FRANCE.

France's interests can be summarized as the pursuit of a threefold goal:

- * Guarantee its security against the USSR;
- * Ensure a minimum of dependency on the USA;
- * Neutralize the Federal Republic of Germany vis a vis France, however, not vis a vis the USSR.

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The Frenchman D. Moisi defines this attitude as a "Comfortable Ambiguity."² On the one hand NATO assures its security against the USSR. On the other hand, its national deterrent and absence from NATO's integrated military structure gives a certain independence. Meanwhile, both NATO and the USSR keep the FRG in check.

This policy requires certain conditions. A strong NATO is to the advantage of France. It is paradoxical that France discourages other NATO partners from seeking too much autonomy. This would weaken the Alliance and France's position to act independently. France can only permit itself an independent security policy as long as the other members stay firmly in the integrated military structure of NATO.³

A second condition is a stable Western Germany, firmly committed to NATO. This eliminates the danger of a reemerging, aggressive Germany and protects France against the USSR.

Thirdly, France wants to avoid a reunification of Germany. The most important threat to a predominant French role within a more independent Europe is a reunified Germany. A united Germany would be a source of instability in Europe because it

² D. Moisi, quoted by Rafael Dezcallar, "On West European Defense Cooperation: a Spanish View," The Washington Quarterly 10 (Winter 1987): p. 158.

³ Dezcallar, "On Western European Defense Cooperation": p. 159.

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would promote nationalistic or neutralist feelings. On the one hand, France perceives that a united Germany remaining in a purely European defense system would become too predominant. On the other hand, a united Germany with an independent foreign policy would considerably weaken France's position.

The main problem in France's relations with the FRG recently, is Western Germany's radically changed position since it joined NATO. The FRG has gone without an adaptation of its international status in some of its basic aspects. The discrepancy between its international status and its potential power threatens the long term stability of the FRG and Europe.

France wants to keep the FRG in a collective European defense framework. Therefore, it must offer the FRG a more important role in West European security. France's interest in enhancing its military co-operation with Western Germany and in reviving the WEU and the Elysee Treaty has to be seen in this context.⁴

France's perception of the European security scene has undergone a gradual shift since the end of the nineteen-seventies. De Gaulle's fixation on French sovereignty made place for a more pragmatic approach. This was largely stimulated by

⁴ On 22 January 1963 the FRG and France signed a Treaty of co-operation known as the Elysee Treaty. It provides for the co-ordination in foreign affairs, defence, information and cultural affairs.

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neutralist trends in Western Europe, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany. France no longer considers European defense co-operation and alliance with the USA as mutually incompatible.⁵ Therefore, it supports building a stronger European pillar of NATO. France's "independent" position would be secured because it would have a major role in a more independent Europe.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

Since joining NATO, the position of the Federal Republic of Germany has undergone major changes. From a defeated country whose punishment should continue forever, it has become a loyal member of the Alliance. In conventional armaments and in economic power it is the second most powerful country in NATO.

A major goal of the Federal Republic of Germany is to reinforce its international legitimacy; i.e., to revise its international status.⁶ It seeks a realignment of its international role with its economic weight and firm commitment to democracy. In the foreseeable future, it does not seek to assert its leadership in security matters. It seems still more reluctant to do so in nuclear matters.⁷

⁵ Stanley R. Sloan. NATO's Future. Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain (1985): p. 165.

⁶ Dezcallar, "C- West European Defense Cooperation": p. 160.

⁷ Ibid, p. 160-161.

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A second main concern to the FRG is the reduction of tension because of its position between two rival blocks. In this context and with a reunification of Germany in view, it focuses on alleviating the tensions with the Soviet Bloc through its Ostpolitik.

Reunification is a stated goal of the Federal Republic of Germany.⁸ However, it does not seem to be the most important item on the German agenda:

For us in Germany the German question remains open: we are called to achieve the reunification of Germany. But the German question must not have priority over peace. This is the contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany to the stability in Europe.

On 18 October 1988, Chancellor Kohl emphasized this once more in a speech on European Unity in Brussels by recalling Konrad Adenauer's maxim that "Freedom takes precedence over unity."¹⁰ Under these conditions, the FRG options to exercise a greater influence over its own

⁸ The Federal Republic of Germany is committed to reunification through its Constitution, however only by peaceful means.

⁹ H. Schmidt, "The Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture 1977," Survival 20 (January 1978): p. 1.

¹⁰ "The German Temptation" The Economist (London), (November 12, 1988): p. 51.

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security situation are limited. Therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany considers an active participation in West European integration and in NATO as a legitimate field for its foreign policy.¹¹ Chancellor Kohl stated in September 1988 that West European cohesion is not a substitute for German unity but a precondition of it. Only a cohesive Europe would have enough weight to strike a deal with Russia and end the continent's, and hence Germany's division.¹² For the same reason, Ostpolitik, strongly linked with detente, as a means of normalizing its relations with East Germany, occupies a central part in the Federal Republic's foreign policy.

Its loyalty to NATO is characterized by "striking a balance between doing too much and doing too little." Either alternative could provoke an American withdrawal. This dilemma constrains the FRG's advocacy of European defense co-operation.¹³

Two considerations are important with relation to the FRG's position within the European security context.

¹¹ Dezcallar, "On West European Defense Cooperation": p. 160.

¹² "The German Temptation" The Economist (London), (November 12, 1988): p. 51.

¹³ Sloan, NATO's Future: p. 165.

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First, Western Europe needs the full potential of the FRG if it wants to play a more assertive role in world affairs. The FRG's geographic position and economic weight make it a cornerstone of any form of united Europe. Also any strategy of defense of Western Europe without an economically and militarily strong Federal Republic of Germany is unrealistic.¹⁴

Second, the FRG's role in international politics which is not in line with its economic weight and military potential, will have to be gradually transformed. To achieve this, the Federal Republic of Germany will have to surmount many countries' aversion, in particular that of France and the Soviet Union.¹⁵

THE UNITED KINGDOM.

The interests of the United Kingdom are largely different from those of the continental countries. Its main concern is to find the best possible position under the US nuclear umbrella. Meanwhile, it seeks to conserve its

¹⁴ David Kramer and Glenn Yago, "West Germany Contends with the Alliance Crisis," in Walter Goldstein, ed., Fighting Allies. Tensions within the Atlantic Alliance (1986): p. 127.

¹⁵ Dezcallar, "On Western European Defense Cooperation:" p. 160-163.

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influence through its "special relationship" with the USA, even though this is less "special" than it once was.¹⁶

Great Britain's foreign policy is characterized by a strong sense of nationalism and a outspoken reluctance to join a uniting Europe wholeheartedly. It is constantly anxious to maintain a proper balance between continental and Atlantic views. This it pursues constantly within NATO and within the context of a West European defense co-operation. This aspect of British participation in European defense co-operation is highly desirable to the USA, as it would help moderate potential conflict between the USA and Western Europe.¹⁷

The immediate consequences of Britain's interests are an active support for NATO and for US leadership in world affairs. The United Kingdom does not back a third pole trying to assert its independence. It fears that strengthening of a European pillar would result in the US revising its commitment to NATO. This would strengthen the burden on the UK and would be to the disadvantage of Western Europe.

¹⁶ Sloan, NATO's Future: p. 166.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 168.

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However, through its membership of the WEU, the UK has taken upon itself a strong continental commitment. This is not only in support of its own security interests but it also seeks to forestall an American reduction or disengagement from Europe. It recognizes the political importance the Americans attach to the commitment of another non-continental power, whose membership of the Atlantic Alliance also meant a break with tradition.¹⁸ It also helps France to accept a strong Western Germany.

Until now, the UK has shown no real interest in participating fully in West European defense initiatives. Britain does, however, realize that "missing the bus"¹⁹ would deny it the capability to influence the European security dimension. This could explain its recent actions to support the revival of the WEU.

THE OTHER WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

The BENELUX and Italy are among the most staunch advocates of European unity and are among the original members of the WEU. Spain and Portugal have joined the WEU

¹⁸ Christopher Coker, The Future of the Atlantic Alliance (1984): p.68.

¹⁹ David Garnham, The Politics of European Defense Cooperation. Germany, France, Britain and America (1988): p. 103.

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in November 1988. They are now awaiting ratification, expected for the spring of 1989. France supported their application for membership from the beginning. The WEU, expanding southward, enhanced Paris' position by making France more at its political and geographical center.

Through their voice within a West European security organization, the smaller states can exert a greater influence than they could independently.

A major concern, however, is to avoid a Franco-German-British directorate. Therefore, they find it necessary to provide guarantees against such a domination. Without such a guarantee, these countries could prefer a certain dependency on the USA.²⁰

Greece and Turkey are both showing an increased interest in joining the WEU. Denmark and Norway are also clearly interested. However, within the WEU concern has been expressed about a too rapid expansion of the WEU. Especially Britain argues that membership should be limited to countries that are "serious" about defense. Greek and Danish anti-nuclear stances would certainly not enhance cohesion within the WEU. Norway and Turkey pose another problem because they are not members of the EEC and other European

²⁰ Dezcallar, "On West European Defense Cooperation": p. 162.

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institutions.²¹ Even though Turkey has applied for EEC membership, it will take years before it will be able to join the Common Market.

THE SOVIET UNION.

In Europe the Soviet Union is a status quo power. Its main interest is to maintain the position it achieved at the end of the Second World War.

Its greatest fear is a reunited Germany. The USSR considers that a reunified Germany, even under a communist regime, would threaten its leadership in Europe.²² This would undermine its position in other parts of the world. It wants to maintain a bipolar world where the Western and Eastern Europeans stay within the orbit of their respective protectors. The Soviet Union wants to avoid at all costs a more independent Western Europe setting the example for its satellites. It fears a West European power center would act as a magnet on Eastern Europe.²³

²¹ Jane's Defence Weekly (18 February 1989): p. 257.

²² Dezcallar, "On West European Defense Cooperation": p. 162.

²³ Pierre Lellouche, "Guidelines for a Euro-Defence Concept" in Jonathan Alford and Kenneth Hunt, eds., Europe in the Western Alliance. Toward a European Defence Entity (1988): p. 69.

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The first requisite therefore is a weak FRG. A divided Western Europe, certainly not under the leadership of the FRG, is the second. Therefore, the FRG has to retain its status of defeated country. The dilemma the Soviet Union fears most is that it would have to choose between a weak Western Europe dominated by a strong Germany and an independent Germany out of any control.²⁴

Gorbachev's reform drives have important implications for Western security. His leadership style, his policy of perestroika and his skilful handling of arms reduction proposals have generated a euphoria in Western European public opinion. The former Prime Minister of France, Jacques Chirac, warns that one must not lose sight of the cleavage between appearance and reality in the Soviet Union. The risk is high that the western public believes that nuclear deterrence is no more necessary for the defense of the West and can be adequately replaced by a hypothetical equilibrium of conventional forces.²⁵ The NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Woerner, considers it necessary to convince Western public that "the chimera of a non-nuclear world held

²⁴ Alistair Buchan, Europe's Futures, Europe's Choices (1969): p. 115.

²⁵ Jacques Chirac, "Soviet Change and Western Security," Strategic Review 17 (March 1989): pp. 14-15.

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out by Gorbachev would not lead to a safer world." Even if heavily asymmetrical conventional reductions are achieved, a minimum nuclear stockpile would be needed.²⁶ As long as there is no slowing down of the Soviet defense effort, the West has to remain alert.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Ideally, the United States of America would want to maintain its influence Europe, but at a lesser cost. If the present hegemony can no longer be upheld, it must seek to secure its security interests in Western Europe in the best possible manner.

Therefore, it actively supports efforts towards West European integration. There is, however, a constant degree of uneasiness that a united Europe would be a strong competitor. Also, when it came to an attempt by WEU nations to define a common position on arms control in the spring of 1985, America objected. The US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs sent a letter requesting the WEU governments not to agree on arms control positions outside

²⁶ Manfred Woerner, "Managing European security," Survival 31 (1989): p.10.

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meetings with the US.²⁷ The WEU effectively abandoned this path after strong pressure by the United States.²⁸ The US' main concern is that these initiatives should develop within the Alliance, not against it.

The USA wishes to develop an alliance where Europeans carry the greater burden within Western Europe. This would not only take into account the real economic balance but also allow the USA to concentrate on other priorities.

However, a more balanced alliance will result in a more assertive Western Europe. Moreover, direct consultations between equal partners would only be formalized for relations concerning the Atlantic region. In other parts of the world it is difficult to imagine that the US would willingly give up influence to a more assertive ally.²⁹ However, this situation should not lead the USA to turn its back on Europe. The attitude of hegemony or nothing is not to the long term advantage to the United States. The

²⁷ Trevor Taylor, "European Institutions and Defence" in Alford and Hunt, eds., Europe in the Western Alliance: p. 199.

²⁸ John Palmer, Europe Without America. The Crisis in Atlantic Relations. (1987): p.154.

²⁹ Buchan, Europe's Futures: p. 106.

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USA should not disengage from Europe.³⁰ There are others, however, who disagree.

Acting in its own self-interest and needing allies more than ever, the USA should stay in NATO. As long as it is a world power it has a vital interest in Europe's independence and well-being. On the other hand, Americans are becoming increasingly irritated at the cost of their commitment to European security, at the growing anti-Americanism amongst its allies and at the failure of Western European support for out-of-area actions that they feel are of mutual concern.³¹

The USA has reason to be irritated. It must not, however, deceive itself. Its NATO commitment is still a cheap option.³² Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci expressed this quite clearly when he remarked that "what critics fail to recognize is that the origins of our alliances are strategic, not philanthropic. We do not

³⁰ David Calleo, "NATO's Middle Course," Foreign Policy 69 (Winter 1987-88): p. 135.

³¹ For a more elaborate discussion of tensions between the allies, Cfr. Infra Chapter IV.

³² Coker, The Future of the Atlantic Alliance: p. 69.

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maintain alliances as a favor to our allies - but because it is in our interest to do so."³³

WESTERN EUROPE.

Western Europe has not yet defined a clear set of security interests. The European Political Co-operation is beginning to develop common foreign policy positions but is not really treating security issues.

All West European countries have valuable assets to contribute. A minimum participation would have to be that of France, the FRG and the UK. Italy and the BENELUX, as founding members of both the EEC and the WEU, would almost certainly participate.

Some countries, especially the Scandinavian nations, Ireland and Greece may find it difficult to identify themselves with one Western European defense policy.³⁴ As Stanley Sloan writes, "The European allies will have to make important choices between leaving some countries behind or

³³ Frank, C., Carlucci. "America's Alliance Structure and the New Isolationism," Defense 88 (July/August 1988): p. 2.

³⁴ None are members of the WEU. Ireland is not a member of NATO. Moreover, Ireland, as a neutral country, does not want any European institutions getting involved in security matters. Greece and Denmark, with their strongly anti-nuclear policy, are expected to complicate the formulating of a common policy.

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moving only as fast as the most reluctant participant will allow."³⁵

INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSIONS .

This condensed analysis allows us to draw five major operational conclusions in relation to the Western European security dimension:

- * The key to West European military co-operation is the Franco-German relationship;
- * This co-operation can only be meaningful if the United Kingdom participates fully. Not only is its substantial military contribution vital, but it also provides a political and geographical balance;
- * A Franco-German-British directorate should not be allowed to rule a European defense co-operation. This would make the smaller powers seek protection from the United States and would undermine its truly European character;
- * The reunification of Germany, although pursued positively by the FRG, is undesirable for many countries, especially for the USSR and for France;

³⁵ Sloan, NATO's Future: p. 170.

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- * A closer defense co-operation between West European nations is not necessarily to the disadvantage of the USA. It would however inevitably lead to a reduction of American influence in Europe.
- * Neither the Soviet Union nor the US is ready to live with the consequences of an autonomous Western European power center.³⁶

CONFLICTING INTERESTS .

The reunification of Germany constitutes the major clash in interests, especially between Germany, the Soviet Union and France. Moreover, it is doubtful if any other actor has a positive view of German reunification.

The establishment of a European Pillar within NATO, which carries its appropriate share of the Alliance's burden, requires a rearrangement of the balance of decision-making. This implies that the USA would accept playing a less important role in Europe.

The Soviet perception of a united West Europe and its influence on the East European countries certainly does not coincide with the West European and American interests.

³⁶ Lellouche, "Guidelines for a Euro-Defence Concept": p. 70.

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COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS .

The alleviating of the burden of the American commitment to Europe corresponds with both the European and American goals. The Europeans wish a greater say in their own security affairs. For the USA, it is in line with the necessity to curb its deficit and to reorientate resources to other parts of the globe. France and the USSR are the primary actors concerned with a German reunification.

ACTORS ' POWER TO PURSUE INTERESTS .

Instead of examining the elements of power of each actor independently, the following paragraphs will compare their geography, national will, and economic, political, and military power.

GEOGRAPHY.

The countries of the WEU constitute the core of Western Europe. As a whole, they lack strategic depth. They do, however, occupy different strategic positions. The Federal Republic of Germany is on the front line, marginally

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protecting
France and
the BENELUX.
The UK, Italy
and ,
especially,
Spain and
Portugal are
relatively
well
protected in
third
position.




FIG. 3

They are densely populated. However, the population's growth rate is negative. This impacts on their capacity to provide sufficient numbers of trained conventional forces. The yearly growth rate for the population of Western Europe has fallen to 0.58%. Moreover, certain cultural or religious entities - Muslim (Turkey) or Catholic (Ireland) - still show important growth rates. Economic conditions have a negative impact on the birth-rate; consequently the most powerful Western European countries are confronted with the problem of dwindling

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manpower resources.³⁷ A realistic estimate is that the peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr will have to be reduced from 495,000 to 450,000 by the end of next decade.³⁸

The military manpower structure is shown in figure 3. The WEU countries have an important manpower reserve at their disposal. However, it is not in relation to the power of the respective countries. For instance, Spain, which is a relative weak military power, possesses the biggest war time reserves.

The members of the WEU have a great diversity of cultures and languages. They do, nevertheless, have a common cultural background, going back centuries. Even if this did not prevent wars in the past, it is supporting a growing European consciousness.

The USA has important forward deployed forces in Europe. Its reinforcements depend, however, on long and vulnerable sea lines of communications. The USSR has safer lines of communications but perceives the NATO forces in Europe as a threat on its front door step.

³⁷ UEO, L'impact de l' Evolution Démographique sur la Défense de l'Europe Occidentale (1988): p. 12.


³⁸ David Kramer and Glenn Yago, "West Germany Contends with the Alliance Crisis": p. 133.

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ECONOMY.

Figure 4 compares the GDPs of the WEU countries.³⁹ Relevant is that Italy surpassed the United Kingdom in 1986. Figure 5 situates the WEU economic potential in relation to the USA and the USSR. However, the WEU countries constitute only a part of the EEC, which is the economic entity of a uniting Europe.

All members are mineral and energy dependent and rely heavily on imports from overseas.



The economic mobilization potential for the WEU is modest. A conflict in Western Europe is expected to be decided in a matter of weeks. All countries are to a more or lesser extent in the fire-line. They will not be able to mobilize substantial economic forces at such short notice.

³⁹ The following graphs are based on data from the Military Balance (1988).

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


FIG. 5

POLITICS.

The members of the WEU are all democracies. The UK, France and the BENELUX have an unbroken democratic tradition of nearly two centuries. The FRG and Italy became firmly established as democracies after the end of the last World War. Spain and Portugal have shed their

dictatorial regimes in the nineteen-seventies. The political climate in all countries is stable, even though some countries are fighting separatist movements. All signatories are also members of NATO and the EEC.

MILITARY.

Figures 6 and 7 respectively show the defense expenditure and manpower structure of the members of the WEU. The FRG has the strongest ground forces. France and the UK spend a big effort in the upkeep of their independent nuclear forces. All have conscript armies, with the

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exception of the UK and Luxembourg. This explains the relative small size of the British forces.

The WEU countries have numerous overseas commitments.⁴⁰

Britain, France, Belgium and the




FIG. 6




FIG. 7

Netherlands have forces stationed in the FRG. Britain has small forces in Hongkong and Belize and a brigade sized force in the Falklands. It also provides military technical assistance to all continents. France has important


commitments in Africa, French Guyana and the South

⁴⁰ For a comprehensive overview of out-of-area activities of West European countries, see Trevor Taylor, European Defence Cooperation (1984): pp. 67-80.

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Pacific. Belgium concentrates its technical military co-operation on Zaire and Rwanda. The Netherlands have a token force in the West Indies. Italy and the FRG give modest technical assistance, especially in Africa.

Figure 8 compares the peacetime and mobilized forces of the WEU, the USA and the Soviet Union. It underlines the great manpower reserves of Western Europe, certainly when one keeps in mind that they are within comparatively short distance of the Soviet Union.



NATIONAL WILL .

National will is a intangible element of power. It consists of different social and psychological components like national self-image, images of others, both of which contribute to public support and cohesion. These are indispensable catalysts for transforming potential power

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into useful power. A last determinant of national will is leadership.⁴¹ It is very difficult to quantify these elements of national will. Therefore, the assessment of national will be limited to four different indicators.




FIG. 9

Figure 9 compares different expressions of defense expenditure: total defense expenditure, defense expenditure

⁴¹ Steven J. Rosen and Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations (1980): pp. 209-212.

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per capita, as percent of the GNP, and as percent of government spending. In terms of percentage of GDP, France and the UK furnish the greatest defense effort. This is partly due to their nuclear programs and their overseas commitments. Except for these two countries, the WEU trails far behind the USA and the USSR. This does not necessarily mean a significant difference in national will. Not having a global position and not maintaining a nuclear force allows for concentrating efficiently in more limited domains. Another factor is the large Air Force and Naval establishments maintained by the USA, the UK and France in comparison to the other NATO allies.

CONCLUSION .

Potentially the members of the WEU are capable of creating a powerful basis for a European pillar of NATO. There are no basic conflicting interests within the WEU. There are, however, some different underlying frictions, especially the fear for a reunited Germany.

The members of the WEU form the core of Western Europe. One has to keep in mind, however, that they only are a part of the European members of NATO and of the EEC.

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This chapter has indicated some reasons for a new interest in Western Europe to take a more active part in determining its own security. Its economic strength, the success of its economic integration, the political motives of countries hoping to enhance their influence through a greater co-operation, are but some reasons. The next chapter will examine many more.

CHAPTER FOUR.

TENSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

A SYSTEMIC CRISIS .

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is undergoing a protracted crisis, severely threatening its cohesion. Tensions within the Alliance certainly are not new. The periods between 1971 and 1974 were very tense as were those between 1961 and 1966 and between 1953 and 1954.

However, some worrisome trends suggest that it is a systemic crisis of transatlantic relations. In order to recreate a widespread consensus, it will require important changes in responsibilities and roles within the Alliance.

One of the solutions put forward is the creation of a European pillar of NATO. To understand how this could lead to a healthier alliance, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the underlying tensions.

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IDENTIFIED TENSIONS .

Apart from the changing conditions during the last forty years, this chapter will distinguish three broad categories of problems.¹

- * Persistent differences between the United States of America and Western Europe.
- * The growing challenge to American economic preponderance .
- * The end of indifference in Western Europe to defense and of consensus on Western security policies.

EVOLUTION OVER THE PAST FORTY YEARS .

In the immediate post-war period the US was unquestionably supreme in every aspect relevant to NATO: political decisiveness, military power, technological capability, economic strength and moral authority.²

¹ Trevor Taylor, European Defence Cooperation (1984): p. 3-14.

² J. Wilkinson and M. Chichester, "Changing Roles in the Alliance", in Christopher Coker, ed., The Future of the Atlantic Alliance (1984): p. 175.

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Forty years later its relative strength within and outside the Alliance has declined. Within the Alliance, this causes problems in the fields of decision-making, credibility in the nuclear deterrence extended to Western Europe, economic balance and relations with the third world.

With respect to the decision-making proces, Robert Jackson considers it shocking that an organization whose business is crisis management is ruled by the rule of unanimity. He contends that this did not lead to great problems in the beginning of the Alliance as "The United States simply ran the organization".³ Nowadays, even if the potential weight of the European partners has increased, they do not speak with unanimity although they consult closely. However, in the last forty years the Alliance has not adapted its basic organization, roles and responsibilities to the new realities.

The nuclear deterrent extended by the USA to its European allies has grown less and less plausible over the years. The US' relative nuclear power has decreased steadily. Soviet-US nuclear parity and the threat of Soviet nuclear superiority caused a shift from massive retaliation to flexible response. It turned hegemony on the cheap into

³ Robert Jackson, Continuity of Discord. Crises and Responses in the Atlantic Community (1985): p. 14.

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an expensive arms race.⁴ With the US directly at risk, NATO became an entangling alliance. West Europeans began questioning the wisdom of relying entirely on American nuclear protection.

The Economic balance between the United States of America and Western Europe has changed dramatically. From a post-war American economic hegemony, over a period of economic expansion with enough markets to satisfy all partners, it developed into rising tensions with increasingly assertive European competitors. US Senator A. Gore puts it clearly when he says:

When NATO was formed, American economic power seemed almost limitless. Today, that power remains very substantial, but we are no longer dominant in the absolute way we once were.⁵

The perception that the US cannot anymore protect all its interests in the Third World has also caused some friction. Western Europe is much more dependent on outside supplies of raw materials. Therefore, it has developed independent economic and political relations with these

⁴ David Calleo, "NATO's Middle Course," Foreign Policy 69 (Winter 1987-88): p. 138.

⁵ A. Gore, "US, West Europe Roles in NATO Future," ROA National Security Report 1 (January 1989): p. 14.

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countries, often in direct competition with the United States of America.

PERSISTENT DIFFERENCES .

During the last years persistent differences on individual defense and security questions have emerged more and more openly. They can be grouped in the following general categories: European "unhappiness", American "unhappiness", and diverging perceptions of the international system.⁶

WESTERN EUROPEAN "UNHAPPINESS".

Western European "unhappiness" has different causes: new emerging strategic doctrine for NATO, out-of-the-area questions, detente, Western European resistance to being considered as a forward base, the two-way street in arms procurement and a series of miscellaneous problems.⁷

The modernization and installation of INF caused NATO to re-evaluate its strategy of Flexible Response which many

⁶ Taylor, European Defence Cooperation: pp. 4-11.

⁷ The discussion of these points is based largely on Steve Smith, "Changing the Conventional Defence of NATO: No-First-Use, Deep Strike and 'Emerging Technologies'" in Walter Goldstein, ed., Fighting Allies. Tensions within the Atlantic Alliance (1986): pp. 55-68.

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considered no longer adequate or practical and to examine new strategies. Samuel Huntington contends that

...in its current formulation, flexible response is seen as inadequate by the strategists, insupportable by the public, and, one must assume, increasingly incredible by the Soviets.⁸

If NATO revises Flexible Response, the ensuing debate would certainly focus on the relative expenditure of nuclear versus conventional defense. This would provoke a turmoil which could threaten the harmony within the Alliance.

General Rogers considers the lack of consensus in the conventional area the most elusive. The consistent neglect of conventional capabilities has allowed the gap between NATO and the Warsaw Pact conventional forces to widen continuously. At the same time the credibility of the nuclear deterrent has decreased. Instead of a workable Flexible Response, the nuclear threshold is being lowered to such an extent that in case of hostilities NATO would have to resort fairly quickly to nuclear weapons in the "Deliberate Escalation".⁹ These considerations have lost none of their validity.

⁸ Quoted by Stanley R. Sloan in, NATO's Future. Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain (1984): p. 139.

⁹ B. Rogers, "NATO, The Next Decade", in Coker, ed., The Future of the Atlantic Alliance: p. 133.

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On the other hand, some defense analysts consider that a conventional defense of Western Europe will soon be possible.¹⁰ Three concepts, critical when considering the future of conventional defense require examining: no-first-use, deep strike and emerging technologies.¹¹ All three of these concepts, however, provoke serious possibilities for frictions within NATO.

No-first-use poses three challenges. It cripples forward defense through loss of nuclear deterrence. It points to Europe's unwillingness to fund additional conventional forces. Finally it erodes the credibility of extended US nuclear deterrence as it lessens the likelihood of American involvement in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union.

Deep strike and emerging technologies make Europeans fear that the US want to limit their commitment to use nuclear weapons. It is interpreted by some Europeans as a move towards warfighting instead of a reactive defense posture. This could involve NATO forces in offensive operations in Eastern Europe or risks giving up West German territory to position forces to attack Warsaw Pact's flanks.

¹⁰ Coker, The Future of the Atlantic Alliance: p. 16.

¹¹ S. Smith, "Changing the Conventional Defence of NATO": p. 55.

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The expense of these weapons would be prohibitive in the actual economic context. Emerging technologies would widen even more the imbalance of arms procurement over the Atlantic and threaten a solution for a two way street. A supplementary danger would be the near impossibility to distinguish some of these weapons from nuclear ones as they would use identical or similar vectors.

Out-of-the-area questions undermine relations between Europe and the USA due to Western European reluctance to get involved outside the NATO area." Robert Jackson puts it clearly when asks the following question:

Can there be a unity of purpose in the Alliance when the European allies concentrate and act on European issues and deal only symbolically with the rest of the world while the United States must focus on security and economic questions everywhere?¹²

The American perception that the Europeans do not look after Western interests outside of Europe is felt as not entirely fair. The British war in the Falklands, the French commitment in Chad and the French and Belgian interventions in Zaire are seen as examples of their involvement. The sending of more than twenty warships to the Persian Gulf in 87-88 demonstrates West European willingness

¹² Jackson, Continuity of Discord: p. 20.

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to intervene out-of-area if necessary.¹³ It does, however, also demonstrate the limits of European co-operation out-of-area. It showed the utility of the WEU mechanism, yet it was only Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands which co-operated quite closely. France and Italy took an independent line.¹⁴ The FRG limited itself to replacing allied ships in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean.

The Western European countries are not as inclined to intervene outside of Europe as often and easily as the Americans. This is the result of a different analysis of the situation and the more modest means at their disposal. They also perceive some of the American insistence of taking part in some of the out-of-area activities as a move by the USA to alleviate their defense budget. This could be done by compensation (replacing US forces earmarked to NATO) or by strengthening European forces designed for use out-of-area.¹⁵

Western Europe never abandoned the idea of detente. In the spirit of the Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of

¹³ Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "Western Europe and the United States" in Jackson, ed., Continuity of Discord: p. 230.

¹⁴ John Chipman, "European Responses Outside Europe," in Jonathan Alford and Kenneth Hunt, eds., Europe in the Western Alliance. Toward a European Defence Entity? (1988): p. 126.

¹⁵ Taylor, European Defence Cooperation: p. 70.

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the Alliance, it continued the dual policy of defense and detente.¹⁶ It did not share America's enthusiasm with détente in the beginning of the seventies, nor did it share the US' return to confrontation under President Reagan.

West Europe also resists being considered as a forward base, available automatically for economic, diplomatic or even military pressure.¹⁷ This has been the object of bitter mutual reproaches between some Western European countries and the United States, especially in the aftermath of the attack on Libya.¹⁸

Other more or less important reasons for Western European "unhappiness" are the wish for a two way street in arms procurement, the handling by President Carter of the hostage crises in Iran, martial law in Poland, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the refusal to ratify SALT II. President Reagan's policies toward Nicaragua, Angola, Kampuchea, Libya and Grenada, the handling of the Siberian Pipeline issue and the military build-up of America shook the already fragile consensus among Western Allies.

¹⁶ Reimund Seidman, "European security? A Political Demythologicalization" in Jackson, ed., Continuity of Discord: p. 142.

¹⁷ Calleo, "NATO's Middle Course": p. 139.

¹⁸ The only Western European country to have supported the US actively during the Libya raid was the UK.

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European doubts about the US commitment to arms control have persisted for years. This impression was enhanced by Gorbachev's diplomatic offensives designed to split the Alliance. When Reagan suddenly made an agreement on INF in 1987, the Europeans feared that the Americans were ignoring their security concerns. "It appeared that, when it came to arms control, President Reagan could do no right in European eyes; at first the Administration was too antagonistic, now too enthusiastic."¹⁹

AMERICAN "UNHAPPINESS" .

From the American point of view, burden-sharing within the Alliance certainly is the most direct source of discontent. In June 1984 Senator Nunn introduced an amendment that was defeated by a vote of 41 to 55. It represented the strongest expression yet of American frustration about the defense funding within NATO:

...the permanent ceiling ... shall be reduced by 30,000 unless, during the previous calendar year, member nations of NATO, other than the United States, have increased their defense spending by an

¹⁹ James Steinberg, "European Defence Cooperation: Why Now?" in Alford and Hunt, eds., Europe in the Western Alliance: p. 45.

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aggregate average of at least three percent, after inflation.²⁰

The view that the Western Europeans are not pulling their weight causes problems for each American administration, especially during a time of budgetary deficit.

Many Americans consider the West European members of NATO "free-riders": they feel free to compete in trade but feel equally comfortable to leave the greatest part of the defense burden to the US.²¹

A second point of friction is the American view of a European refusal to face up to dangers out-of-the-NATO-area. The US considers itself as guaranteeing collective vital interests outside the NATO boundaries and expects its allies to assist her in discharging that responsibility.²² The problem is that what the US judges to be collective vital interests are not always regarded as such by its NATO partners. Nor do they always agree about the manner the US handles the problem. Moreover, the NATO Treaty explicitly

²⁰ Phil Williams, "The Nunn Amendment, Burden Sharing, and U.S. Troops in Europe," Survival 27 (January/February 1985): pp.2-10.

²¹ Calleo, "NATO's Middle Course": p. 139-140.

²² An interesting overview of the out-of-area problem within the Alliance can be found in Richard Vine, "Europe and Global Security," in Jonathan Alford and Kenneth Hunt, eds., Europe in the Western Alliance (1988): p. 155-174.

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limits intervention to the area north of the Tropic of Cancer.²³ This has often constituted a welcome excuse for inaction. In 1979, before the House Armed Services Committee Former SACEUR, General Alexander Haig, put it as follows:

...this traditional attitude creates an inflexibility and artificial constraint on Alliance action that will seriously impede its effectiveness. The entire globe is now NATO's concern.²⁴

However, quite recently some Western European countries have realized that the protection of their vital interests outside the Treaty area must be organized on a common basis. As mentioned above, the WEU sent warships on a permanent basis to the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war.

Another source of irritation is the habit of Western European public opinion of placing the two superpowers on the same moral plane. Even if this is the view of a vocal minority, it has important repercussions on the American attitude. Often European public opinion directs its criticism towards NATO (read US) instead of towards the continuing Soviet military expansion. Senator Gore reflects on the irony that "Public opinion polls now indicate,

²³ The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6.

²⁴ Cited by Coker, The Future of the Atlantic Alliance: p. 96.

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ironically, that millions of people in Western Europe see the Soviet Union and the United States as approximately equal sources of risk."²⁵

DIVERGING PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.

Hostilities in the Third World are viewed by the USA as part of a more global struggle for influence. The United States consider the Middle East, South America, Asia and South Africa as pawns in the worldwide conflict with the Soviet Union. Europeans view Third World conflicts as of local and regional origin. They do not agree there is an automatic linkage with communism, even though they accept that often conflicts are exploited by the Soviets. Europeans have different views on Middle East issues.

EPC resolutions in favour of the Palestinians and the disagreement with the boycott of the Moscow Olympics point to a diverging interpretation of the international scene.²⁶ Concern about the way President Carter handled the hostage crisis with Iran and what some Europeans perceived

²⁵ Gore, "US, West Europe Roles in NATO's Future": p. 15.

²⁶ Ferdinand Kinsky, "A European Defense System: Proposals for Restructuring Nato" in Jackson, ed., Continuity of Discord: pp. 131-132.

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as an overreaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not further the cause of the Alliance.

West Europeans view international relations from a less ideological standpoint and from a different historical experience with the USSR and Russia. Since abandoning their empires, often encouraged by the USA, they have concentrated on Europe. The United States of America as a world power is naturally much more concerned about other parts of the world. Even if until now NATO has been the cornerstone of the American collective security policy, other parts of the world are requiring more and more attention. The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy states that the international security environment will change dramatically. The USA will confront a vastly more complex environment consisting of new major powers and new kinds of weaponry and alliances. The report sees a shift in American involvement to the Pacific and to the Western Hemisphere.²⁷

²⁷ The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence (1988): p. 6.

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END TO US ECONOMIC
PREPONDERANCE .

Walter Goldstein distinguishes six major causes of economic discord among the Alliance members: ²⁸

- * Import limits to promote industrial growth and employment;
- * Export subsidies to boost national sales;
- * Interest rates and exchange rates as instruments of monetary policy;
- * National experiments with "Industrial policy" to preserve failing sectors or to promote promising ones;
- * Disputes over East- West trade, some countries wanting to use trade as a political instrument, others wanting to pursue trade at any cost;
- * The interdependency of the global economy.

Moreover, European governments consider that an overall goal of American economic politics is to make their partners pay the price for the American budget deficit. The persistently high international interest rates blamed on the US deficit is seen as misuse of the dollar as an instrument

²⁸ Walter Goldstein, "Economic Discord in the Alliance" in Jackson, ed., Continuity of Discord: pp. 184-185.

TENSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

of US foreign policy. The creation of the European Monetary System was the first step in forming a financial entity more independent of the USA. It marked a break up of the dollar dominated post-war monetary system of the Bretton Woods agreement.²⁹

The need to strengthen the conventional forces in times of economic problems, generated a revival of the burden sharing problem and of the question of the one way street of armaments purchases.

These economic problems influence the transatlantic relations directly. The US commitment to Europe will become more difficult to defend as other defense priorities become more pressing and as American economic preponderance declines further.

DISAPPEARANCE OF PUBLIC CONSENSUS .

The last years have been characterized by a systematic erosion of Western European consensus on security affairs.

²⁹ Hugo Kauffmann, "Economic Crises in the Atlantic Community and Responses to These Crises" in Jackson, ed., Continuity of Discord: p. 210.

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The reasons are manifold. The expectations raised by detente threatened to undermine and to dissolve the cohesion necessary for sustaining it.³⁰ Despair that detente was not working because of the neutron bomb controversy, the refusal of the US to ratify the SALT II agreement and the installation of the cruise missile and the Pershing, gave the feeling that the arms race was not being checked or controlled.

A skillful information campaign could have prevented many adverse reactions. As it was, this lack went hand in hand with one of the greatest concerted and most effective propaganda campaigns set up by the Soviets since the Second World War.

The main reason of the want of support by the West European public opinion of NATO is not only this lack of information. As Professor Sir Michael Howard writes, "A public stops supporting a defence policy in which it does not have a responsibility."³¹

From an Atlantic point of view, a new phenomenon is that within the younger generations on both sides of the

³⁰ Werner Link, cited by Jackson, Continuity of Discord: p. 18.

³¹ Michael Howard, "Reassurances and Deterrence: Western Defence in the 1980s," Foreign Affairs 61 (Winter 1982/83): p. 309.

TENSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

Atlantic "interest in the other is shrinking."³² The common sacrifices of the two World Wars which bound previous generations in Europe and in America together are now things of the past.

CONCLUSION .

The Atlantic Community as it existed during its first forty years has evolved substantially. The economic balance has shifted markedly, the relative power of the US in the world has altered, as has the threat to the US and to Western Europe.

All these problems are surmountable, but only on condition that NATO succeeds in formulating and stating clearly a new strategy so that all ambiguous elements can be clarified.

If NATO wants to avoid frictions on out-of-the-area issues, its members should decide if they should officially become involved in crises outside the Treaty's formal jurisdiction.³³

³² Josef Joffe, " European-American Relations: the Enduring crisis," Foreign Affairs 59 (spring 1981): p. 846.

³³ Pieter Dankert, "Europe Together, America Apart," Foreign Policy 53 (Winter 1983-84): p. 29.

TENSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

Europe's major problem has been summarized by P. Dankert as follows:

[the] Alliance's structure inhibits confronting the real problem-the fundamental differences between the United States and Western Europe over the scale and the nature of the threat to the Western security, the most appropriate responses, and the quantity of military insurance the West needs to safeguard its security. These differences will only be resolved if and when West European provide their own assessment of security issues in a collective and coherent manner.³⁴

The options the West Europeans have in defining their security interests within or outside an Atlantic Alliance, is the subject of chapter seven. However, before examining these, it is necessary to look into the evolution of the WEU from its establishment until its reactivation.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 29.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE "DORMANT" YEARS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION.

INTRODUCTION.

Very soon after the establishment of the West European Union, the organization became moribund. Until its reactivation in 1984, it achieved only a few successes.

During the dormant years of the WEU, some initiatives sought to develop Western European co-operation in security matters. They were, however, taken outside the West European Union.

ACHIEVEMENTS.

From 1954 to 1973 the WEU only succeeded in two important missions.

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In 1954 it played a major role in solving the Saar problem and thus contributed to the reconciliation between France and Germany.¹ Secondly, before the United Kingdom joined the EEC, the WEU functioned as a forum where the Six and Great Britain could consult together.

The Saar problem resulted from the aftermaths of the First World War. At the Treaty of Versailles France was awarded the rich mining region of the Saar as a compensation for the economic losses endured during the war. The Saar was placed under trusteeship of the League of Nations and administrated by France. A plebiscite was held after 15 years. A vast majority chose for a return to Germany. After the Second World War the French tried to annex it. The USA and the UK accepted an economic attachment of the Saar to France. After the establishment of the FRG, Western Germany demanded the return of the region. It compared the situation with their loss of German territory in the East. An agreement reached together with the WEU Treaty proposed to

¹ For a concise overview of the Saar problem see Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Britain in Western Europe. WEU and the Atlantic Alliance (1978, c1956): pp. 90-93.

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give the Saar a European status within the WEU.² The Saar problem was ultimately solved in 1954 when it returned to the FRG.

Before the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community in 1973, the WEU provided the only constitutional forum linking the UK and the Six original EEC members. This was achieved by using the economic provisions of the Treaty. Articles I and VIII of the Treaty define the organization's activities in the economic field. Article I states that "the ... Parties will so organize and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results..." Article VIII sets up the Council. One of its purposes is to "...permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability." These provisions were put to practice when, on 11 July 1963, an agreement was reached organizing the exchanges of views between the six members of the EEC and the UK. This did not happen, however, without difficulties. At the time the French were refusing to allow

² The Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the French Republic on the Saar Statute is an integral part of the Paris Agreements of 23 October 1954. Its text can be found in RIIA, Britain and Western Europe: pp. 118-120.

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the UK entry in the Common Market. They saw this use of the WEU as a means of getting round their refusal and objected.³ However, once the negotiations got under way between the Community and Great Britain on 14 September 1973, this role of the WEU ceased officially. The principles of the consultations nor the agreement of 11 July 1963 were, however, questioned in any way.⁴

These two activities were, nevertheless, the two only important achievements. The decline of the West European Union set in practically immediately after its establishment.

THE DECLINE .

The Western European Union Treaty provides formally for activities in the fields of security, economics and socio-cultural affairs.⁵ By 1959, however, other

³ Bernard Burrows and Geoffrey Edwards, The Defence of Western Europe (1982): pp. 43-44.

⁴ Assemblée de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale, L'Union de l'Europe Occidentale. Rapport d'Information (1986): p. 13.

⁵ The basic article dealing with the security aspect in the Treaty is Article V. The economic role of the Western European Union is elaborated in articles I and VIII, the cultural and social role in articles II and III.

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organizations had stripped the Western European Union of its most important formal functions.

From the outset it was clear that no member had any doubt that NATO should deal with Western European security matters. Article IV of the Paris agreement commits the parties to work in close co-operation with NATO. It states specifically not to duplicate the NATO staffs. Article IV further stipulates that the Western European Union would also rely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for "information and advice on military matters."⁶ Of its military functions, the WEU retained only two minor ones. One was periodically reporting to the Assembly in how far the members were living up to the restrictions and commitments imposed by the Treaty. The other was the work by the Standing Armaments Committee to promote standardization of armament between the members.

In the economic field, Article I of the Western European Union Treaty states there should not be any duplication with "other economic organizations where the member states are or will be represented." When the members of the WEU, with the exception of the United Kingdom, signed

⁶ For a more detailed discussion on the relationship between NATO and the WEU see p. 35 above.

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the Treaty of Rome to establish the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, the WEU lost its economic mission.

Finally in 1959 the Western European governments decided to transfer social and cultural matters, mentioned in articles II and III, to the Council of Europe. This transfer touched on the activities of the WEU, not on its powers.⁷

After the United Kingdom, the Irish Republic and Denmark began negotiating officially to join the EEC in 1973, the WEU's last substantial mission vanished. The organization became moribund until the beginning of the eighties. The Council did not hold any meetings at ministerial level until 1984. The organization lacked all political impulse. The Parliamentary Assembly tried to play a role through demanding the establishment of a European security dimension. But from lack of an executive ministerial power whom it should address, its initiatives did not have any success.⁸ The Assembly complained that the

⁷ Assemblée de l'UEO, L'Union de l'Europe Occidentale: pp. 12-13.

⁸ Alfred Cahen. "De WEU op het Kruispunt van de Europese Constructie" [The WEU on the Crossroads of the European Construction] (1989). Conference held by Ambassador Cahen, Secretary General of the WEU, for "Mars en Mercurius" on 21 October 1988 in Brussels.

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Council did not take any notice of its recommendations. On grounds that the European Community had not yet reached the point where it could present a collective view, the Council did not take any pains to answer the Assembly's questions in a satisfactory manner.⁹ Between 1974 and 1977 the members did not even nominate a Secretary-General.

Thus, during the first part of its existence the WEU did not succeed in attaining its main goal of creating a European security dimension. During this period, however, different European countries took initiatives for defence co-operation outside the framework of the Western European Union.

INITIATIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY OUTSIDE THE WEU.

In 1959 the French supported the idea of a political union of the members of the EEC to include foreign policy and defense. Under a French Chairman, Christian Fouchet, a committee was set up to draft a treaty. When Belgium and the Netherlands insisted on the participation of Great Britain,

⁹ Christopher Coker, The Future of the Atlantic Alliance (1984): p. 159.

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the plan collapsed. The fear of such a union undermining both NATO and the EEC also contributed to its rejection.¹⁰

In July 1962 President Kennedy promoted a twin pillar concept for the Atlantic Alliance whereby a united Western Europe would strengthen the Alliance.

We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner...capable of playing a greater role in the common defense...we see in such a Europe a partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.¹¹

General De Gaulle feared that the Europeans would remain the junior partners. Moreover, a European pillar could well be dominated by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. Also, the UK and the USA, through their "special relationship" would be able to mutually support each other. The UK on the other hand feared an erosion of that special relationship through the establishment of a European pillar. Moreover, all Europeans

¹⁰ Trevor Taylor, European Defence Cooperation (1984): p. 18.

¹¹ Quoted by John Pinder, "Interdependence: Problem or Solution," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., The Troubled Alliance, Atlantic Relations in the 1980s (1983): p. 72.

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feared a disengagement of the US from Europe. Thus the Kennedy overture was not reacted upon.¹²

The next proposal also came from the US. The Americans proposed the creation of a Multilateral (nuclear) Force.¹³ This would consist of surface ships manned by naval personnel of the different European participating countries and under command of SACEUR. The main idea was twofold. Firstly, it originated from the necessity to restore confidence in the American extended nuclear commitment toward Western Europe. Secondly, through it, the US attempted to prevent the Europeans from developing their own nuclear deterrent by giving them some say in NATO's nuclear strategy. France and the United Kingdom were not at all interested, each being in different stages of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent. Robert McGeehan contends that it intended to "inoculate the Federal Republic of Germany against what was assumed to be an incipient German desire for its own nuclear capability".¹⁴ The other West European

¹² Taylor, European Defense Cooperation: p. 19.

¹³ For an extensive discussion on the nuclear policy of the Alliance in the fifties and the sixties see Robert Hunter, Security in Europe, (1972, c1969): pp. 83-131.

¹⁴ Robert McGeehan, "European Defence Cooperation: a Political Perspective," The World Today 41 (June 1985): p. 119.

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countries were not very enthusiastic either, mainly because of the political implication at home. Eventually the Europeans got some influence on the nuclear policy of NATO when the Nuclear Planning Group was established in 1967.

The sixties did not bring much progress in European defence cooperation. Moreover, the EEC's refused to discuss security matters. From the early 1970's onward the French made different efforts to revive the WEU.¹⁵

The first one was a reaction against developments within NATO. In 1973 the British, supported by the Germans, set up the Eurogroup. This institution within NATO was established to convince the US congress of the European resolve to do more about their own defence.¹⁶ France did not participate in the Eurogroup in concurrence with its policy adopted after leaving NATO's integrated military command. Therefore, the French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert supported a revival of the WEU as an alternative to

¹⁵ The Treaty of Rome does not prohibit the European Economic Community from getting involved in security questions. Article 224 allows the Community to concern itself with security matters if the functioning of the Common Market is affected by serious internal or international tensions.

¹⁶ In the late 1960s and early 1970s Senator Mansfield put forward proposals in the US Senate whereby the Americans would reduce their armed forces in Europe unless the European would contribute substantially more towards the defense of Western Europe.

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Eurogroup. The French wanted especially to develop the work begun by the Standing Armaments Committee to further their arms industry.¹⁷ This first attempt did not gain support from the other members. The French tried to lure the Germans away from the Eurogroup and join them in a revived WEU. The Germans did, however, stay committed to the Eurogroup.

In 1981 the French renewed their support for an active WEU at a time of mounting discontent about burden-sharing in the American Congress. The French Deputy Minister of Defense, Georges Lemoine, addressed the Assembly of the WEU in december 1981 and declared:

...it [France] wishes to discuss them [France's goals] within the only European organization which stems from a specific treaty still in force... That organization is the West European Union.¹⁸

Soon afterwards the British and Italians both reaffirmed that the WEU was the only West European institution where defence matters could be debated. From then onward the voices of support became more and more

¹⁷ An extensive survey of the activities of the WEU between 1954 and 1984 is to be found in Coker, The Future of the Atlantic Alliance: pp. 54-64.

¹⁸ Quoted by Christopher Coker, "The Western European Union and European Security," in Robert J. Jackson, ed., Continuity and Discord. Crises and Responses in the Atlantic Community (1985): p. 160.

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frequent.

The impetus to a greater European integration is not simply a result of tensions between the US and Europe. There are also some positive developments which brought a certain convergence among European governments in the eighties. The conservative governments of the UK and the FRG and the socialists of President Mitterrand in France were in agreement on the key elements of security. Different events showed a mounting interest in a more effective and tangible co-operation. The renewed interest in the Franco-German Elysee Agreement of 1963 brought about the creation of a Franco-German Brigade. This is essentially a symbolic gesture but could become a model of inter-allied collaboration.

By 1984 the governments of the WEU countries were ready to take concrete steps to reactivate this organization.

CHAPTER SIX

THE REACTIVATION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION.

INTRODUCTION.

As mentioned above, the crisis the Alliance is going through is not the only reason for the reactivation of the West European Union. The origin of the revival has also to be searched in the twofold context of the WEU: the WEU is an element of the European construction ¹ and its origins lie in Atlantic solidarity. There is no contradiction at all between these two aspects. According to the WEU's Secretary-General they are complementary.²

¹ European construction refers to the integration process within Western Europe. This necessitates the development of institutions to handle the different dimensions of a uniting Europe.

² Alfred Cahen, "De WEU op het Kruispunt van de Europese Constructie," [The WEU on the Crossroads of the European Construction] (1988). Conference held by Ambassador Cahen, Secretary-General of the WEU, for "Mars en Mercurius" on 21 October 1988 in Brussels: p. 2.

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The European construction has made a certain progress the last decades. The European Economic Community forms the economic dimension. With the European Political Co-operation, Europe is developing a foreign policy dimension. The EPC is indeed an effort to harmonize the positions on foreign policy of the twelve members of the EEC. It does have the competence to treat the economic and political aspects of security. Nevertheless, the security dimension as a whole remains absent.

However, that it is an essential element of the European construction was already stated by Leo Tindemans, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and a convinced European and Atlanticist, in 1975 in his report on the European Union: "European Union will not be complete until it has drawn up a common defence policy."³ In the beginning of the 1980s some initiatives were taken to incorporate the security dimension in the Political Co-operation. Its success has been limited. The EPC has the competence to treat the economic and the political aspects of security but not security as a whole.

Again the impetus to greater European integration was not simply a result of tensions between the US and

³ Quoted by P. de Schouteete de Tervarent, "Europa Waarom?" Studia Diplomatica 40 (January 1987): p. 97.

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Europe. The eighties have seen an evolution which brought about a broad convergence on security matters among European governments. Not only the conservative governments of the UK and the FRG but also the socialists in France are in agreement on the key elements of security.

The most recent statement of the EEC on European Union is the Single European Act of January 1984.⁴ The Act states that closer cooperation in European security matters support in a decisive manner the development of a European identity in matters of foreign policy. Article 6, section 3 states explicitly that the provisions of the Treaty are no obstacle to closer co-operation in security matters between certain members within in the framework of NATO or the WEU.

It does, however, immediately limit the scope of this co-operation. It does not provide for an unambiguous basis to formulate common positions; it simply states that they are prepared to co-ordinate their positions on political and economic aspects of security.⁵ Unhappily, some members of the EEC chose to interpret this last part as

⁴ The Single European Act is the first important revision of the founding Treaty of the EEC, the Treaty of Rome. The European Act constitutes the political act which aims at giving the Community's institutions the means to realize the programme of a single EEC-market by 1992.

⁵ Single European Act, Article 30, paragraph 6.a.

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limitative.⁶ Denmark, Greece and the Irish Republic do not accept a comprehensive security dimension without certain reserves.

It was then that the remaining Seven decided to accomplish this dimension. They called upon an existing organization of which they were the members but which they had not used the last decade.

Once the decision was taken, it was implemented in three meetings:

- * a meeting in Paris of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 12 June 1984.
- * a meeting in Rome of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defense on 26 October 1984.
- * a meeting in Bonn of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 22 April 1985.

The Meeting of Rome gave birth to the Rome Declaration which is considered to be the certificate of rebirth of the WEU.⁷ Together with the following meetings, it defines the goals, the framework of a European security

⁶ Cahen, "De WEU op het Kruispunt van de Europese Constructie": p. 7.

⁷ Alfred Cahen, "Unity Through Common Defence-Western European Union," NATO's Sixteen Nations 31 (June 1986): p.38.

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policy and the new roles of the reactivated WEU.

THE ROME DECLARATION.

The Rome Declaration of October 1984 consists of two parts: the declaration itself and a part called "Institutional Reform of WEU."

ANALYSIS.

The first part contains two important ideas. It stresses that the reactivation of the WEU takes place within the Atlantic framework. Moreover, it has to be considered as a integral part of the larger European construction.

The second part constitutes a separate document. It is the basis of the institutional reform of the WEU and sets out to improve the functioning of the structure and the organization of the West European Union.

At the Rome Meeting of 1984 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework. They declared that NATO remained the foundation of western security. A better utilization of WEU would improve the common defense of all countries of the Atlantic Alliance. They emphasized the indivisibility of security within the Atlantic Treaty area.

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The Ministers stressed that the Council is a central element in the revitalization of the WEU. They decided that it would meet twice a year on the level of the Foreign and Defense Ministers. They supported the idea of greater contact between the council and the Assembly. They insisted on "A substantial improvement in the existing procedures [of the Council] for giving written replies to Assembly on recommendations and questions"⁸

The Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) and the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) are to be reorganized. They are to fulfil a threefold task: study questions relating to arms control and disarmament, study security and defense problems and contribute to European armament co-operation. They continue, however, to carry out their original control functions.

The Minister also stressed the importance of liaison with members of NATO which are not part of the WEU.

⁸ Rome Declaration, Institutional Reform of WEU, article II.1.

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CONSEQUENCES.

The consequences of this declaration are far reaching. The first part contains important repercussions for the WEU as a European institution as well as in its Atlantic context.⁹ As a European institution, the WEU has to keep close contact with the other elements of the European construction, i.e. the EEC and the EPC.

Secondly, every change in the composition of these other elements has its consequences for the WEU. In this context it is interesting to note that Turkey, together with its candidature for the EEC, has expressed interest in joining the WEU.

Thirdly, if all members of the EEC could agree on a common security policy without any reserves, then the WEU would no more be the obvious forum for formulating the European security dimension.

In the Atlantic context the Declaration emphasizes the indispensable necessity to maintain close contacts with the NATO allies outside the WEU. It stresses the

⁹ The following points are largely based on remarks made by Ambassador Cahen during his Conference "De WEU op het Kruispunt van de Europese Constructie."

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responsibility of the Presidency of the WEU to inform those countries on bilateral or multilateral basis.¹⁰

THE GOAL OF THE REACTIVATED WEU.

The Rome Declaration of 1984 underlines renewed interest in a European pillar within NATO. It states that

... a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the Alliance. This will enhance the European Role and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic. We are resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.¹¹

The Declaration also provides for a much improved organization and structure for political consultation. It explicitly adds that the WEU will be the center of common consultation between the members on security problems. Article 8 produces a detailed list of missions for the WEU:

The Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonize their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular:

- defence questions;
- arms control and disarmament;

¹⁰ Rome Declaration, Institutional Reform of WEU, Article IV.2.

¹¹ Rome Declaration, Article 2.

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- the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe;
- Europe's contribution to strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in mind the importance of transatlantic relations;
- the development of European cooperation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus.

They may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.

These missions imply that the WEU's most important task is to form the basis of a European political co-operation in security matters. Through stimulating a permanent dialogue between its members, it hopes to harmonize their views and come to formulating common positions. In creating the conditions for a European security dimension, the WEU seeks to achieve the preconditions for a European security identity and for a European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance.

EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY.

The WEU sets out general lines of a European security policy in the Rome Declaration, the Bonn, Venice and Luxembourg communiques and The Hague Platform. These lines of force cover five general themes: the objectives of

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the Treaty, deterrence of any kind of conflict, active solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance, the role of Europe in a balanced East-West dialogue and arms control.¹²

OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY.

The objectives of the reactivated WEU are twofold: support of European integration and loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance.

The Rome Declaration of 1984 states very general goals as peace, security, European integration and co-operation.¹³

The Hague Platform of October 1987 goes more into specifics and repeats the members' commitment to build a European union in accordance with the Single European Act, they all signed as members of the European Community. It reiterates their conviction that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does

¹² The following abbreviations are used to refer to the texts of declarations, communiques and The Hague Platform.

RD: Rome Declaration (27 October 1984).

BC: Bonn Communique (23 April 1985).

VC: Venice Communique (30 April 1986).

LC: Luxembourg Communique (28 April 1987).

HP: Hague Platform (27 October 1987).

The paragraph numbering of these documents are added to the reference.

¹³ RD 1.

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not include security and defense.¹⁴ It also considers the revitalization of the WEU as an important contribution to the unification of Europe.¹⁵

From an Atlantic viewpoint it stresses the importance of the commitment to maintain a "...coupling with the United States and ensuring conditions of equal security in the Alliance as a whole."¹⁶

DETERRENCE OF ANY FORM OF CONFLICT.

In the Bonn Communique of April 1985, the Ministers emphasized the "continuing quantitative and qualitative development of Soviet military forces which cannot be justified solely by security interests."¹⁷

In both the Bonn Communique of 1985 and The Hague Platform of October 1987 they underscored the indispensable nature of deterrence based ¹⁸ on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces.¹⁹

¹⁴ HP 2.

¹⁵ HP 3.

¹⁶ WEU, The Reactivation of WEU. Statements and Communiques. 1984 to 1987 (1987): p. 49.

¹⁷ BC 3.

¹⁸ BC 3.

¹⁹ HP 2.

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The members also expressed their "appreciation of the contribution which the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom make to deterrence."²⁰

After underlining the essential role of US Forces in Europe as a linkage with the US strategic deterrence,²¹ the Ministers stressed once again the responsibility for the Europeans in the field of conventional and nuclear forces.²²

All these declarations demonstrate clearly that the WEU is not questioning the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance nor its nuclear policy. This attitude of the WEU on nuclear weapons is the basis of the difficulty for Greece and Denmark to join the organization. Ireland's neutrality is of course incompatible with the WEU's links with NATO. The unwillingness of these three members of the EEC to subscribe a common policy risks to develop a Europe integrating at two speeds.

²⁰ VC 2.

²¹ HP 3.

²² HP 4.

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ACTIVE SOLIDARITY WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

The Rome Declaration of 1984 reminds that the Atlantic Alliance preserved the peace for 35 years and that this permitted the construction of Europe.²³

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization "remains the only body for implementing common defence and the expression of the fundamental bond between the security of Europe and that of North America."²⁴

In 1987, in The Hague the members stressed that the security of the Alliance is indivisible.²⁵ They reiterated the value of the Harmel doctrine: "Military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary."²⁶

ROLE OF EUROPE IN A BALANCED EAST-WEST DIALOGUE.

The declarations at the different meetings always mentioned the East-West dialogue. However, except for reaffirming their commitment to the improvement of East-West

²³ RD 4.

²⁴ BC 2.

²⁵ HP I.4.

²⁶ HP 5.

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relations, no tangible propositions were made.²⁷

The Hague Platform of October 1987 stresses that the "Helsinki Final Act continues to serve as our guide to the fulfillment of the objective of gradually overcoming the division of Europe." ²⁸

ARMS CONTROL.

Arms control is treated extensively in the different meetings. At all meetings the Ministers reaffirm their commitment to Arms control and disarmament efforts. These are "aimed at effectively verifiable agreements leading to a stable balance of forces at lower levels..."²⁹

They state their support for the negotiations on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons in Geneva (CD), the Mutual balanced force reductions in Vienna (MBFR), and the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe(CDE).³⁰

²⁷ BC 5. and VC 3.

²⁸ HP III c. 1.

²⁹ LC 7.

³⁰ VC 6.

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The WEU also supported the aim of a 50 % reduction in American and Soviet strategic nuclear forces.³¹

Except for a firm support for arms control and disarmament in certain fields the WEU has, however, not been able to come up with initiatives of its own.

ROLE OF THE WEU.

The adaptation of the organization's roles begun by the Rome Declaration of 1984 and was, continued at the following meetings. They can be grouped under three headings: the WEU and western defense, political consultation within the WEU and the WEU and arms co-operation.

THE WEU AND WESTERN DEFENCE.

Its role in western defense as seen by the reactivated WEU is stated most clearly in article 2 of the Hague Platform of October 1987:

It is our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the Alliance, to the benefit of Western security as a whole. This will enhance the European role in the Alliance and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across the

³¹ LC 9.

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Atlantic. We are resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.

In other words, a greater contribution to the Alliance going hand in hand with more say in Alliance affairs.

POLITICAL CONSULTATION WITHIN THE WEU.

The revival of the West European Union is characterized by a determination to make better use of the WEU framework.³²

The members seek to harmonize their views in particular on defense questions, arms control and disarmament, East-West relations, transatlantic relations and co-operation in the field of armament.³³

The WEU also has a role in European integration as a security forum where member-governments can address specific European questions.³⁴

WEU AND ARMS CO-OPERATION.

The Ministers underlined the importance of arms co-operation on all meetings.

³² RD 3 and BC 2.

³³ RD 8.

³⁴ VC 1.

THE REACTIVATION OF THE WEU

The WEU does not plan to take over the work carried out by the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) and the Chief National Armament Directors(CNAD).³⁵

It does realize the increasing importance of technology and is determined to take the necessary steps within the EEC to strengthen Europe's own technological capacity.³⁶

EXTENSION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION.

The recent admittance to the WEU of Spain and Portugal has shown that the revival is promising.³⁷ It not only demonstrated that more West European countries are recognizing the need for a common security policy, but it also underlines the acceptance of the WEU as the most appropriate forum to harmonize European security positions. This will certainly remain so as long as the EEC or the EPC does not engage actively in security matters.

³⁵ BC 9.

³⁶ BC 10.

³⁷ On the 14 November 1988 Spain and Portugal, both members of NATO, were formally admitted to the WEU. They will become effective members after ratification by their parliaments in the spring of 1989.

THE REACTIVATION OF THE WEU

During the admission ceremony defense and foreign ministers explicitly cautioned that the organization exists under the security arm of NATO. By no means does it intend to undermine the Alliance.³⁸ However, in case of a complete disengagement of the USA from Europe, the WEU could form the framework for a Western European defense organization outside an Atlantic Alliance.

CONCLUSION.

The member governments of the WEU are demonstrating a clear will to develop the organization into a real forum of security matters. They will, nevertheless, have to solve many problems, all of which have been recognized at the different meetings.

For the time the WEU is hamstrung at least by three factors. The WEU still does not have a clear policy direction. Its staff is very limited and split between Paris and London. Its limited membership contributes to the organization's cohesiveness. However, because the WEU represents only some members of NATO and of the EEC, it cannot proclaim itself as embodying a common European view.

³⁸ The Washington Post, (15 November 1988): p. 24.

THE REACTIVATION OF THE WEU

The assumptions upon which this paper is based, makes it focus on an integrating Western Europe solidary with the Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, it will next examine other possibilities, ranging from an Atlanticist reformism to a non-aligned Europe. In doing so it will attempt to avoid wishful thinking.

CHAPTER SEVEN

STRATEGIES OF REFORM.

INTRODUCTION.

This chapter develops step four of the CGSC Strategic Analysis Model.¹ As stated in the introductory chapter, the "prospective" methodology is used to define possible strategies of reform.²

The following paragraphs will consider the four most realistic options for a future European security dimension. They make use of the facts reviewed in the previous chapters. Moreover, the second assumption upon which this thesis is built states that it considers the decline in the present Atlantic order to lead to a greater European integration. Therefore, these models are limited to options based on an integrating Europe.³

¹ See above, p. 15.

² See above, p. 16.

³ See above, p. 10.

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Following the Strategic Analysis Model, this chapter will distinguish between three broad alternatives: maintenance of the status quo, departure from the status quo and a compromise between the two.⁴ Status quo is considered as the maintenance of Atlantic solidarity and accepts certain adaptations to its present structure.

Atlantic Reformism reflects the first alternative with, however, the formation of a European pillar. European Reformism, constitutes the middle option. The third option, considering the specific European context, provides two distinct alternatives: European "Gaullism" on the one hand and a Socialist non-aligned Europe on the other.

ATLANTIC REFORMISM.

Despite the tensions between the allies, strong arguments persist for the continuation of the Atlantic Alliance. The most important one lies in its achievements over the past 40 years. Western Europe has not known war

⁴ US Army, Command and General Staff College, CGSC P511, Joint and Combined Environments (1988): p 29.

STRATEGIES OF REFORM

since the establishment of NATO, while over 130 wars have been fought in so called "nuclear free zones."⁵

Moreover, Atlantic Reformism contains distinct historical overtones. It reflects the ideas of equal partnership which have been proclaimed over the years on both sides of the Atlantic.⁶ Outwardly, Atlantic Reformists support a status quo in transatlantic relations. Inside the Alliance, however, they would like to see a reform in the decision making, whereby the Western Europeans assume a greater say in Alliance affairs.

Most European countries are prepared to pay a certain price to assert themselves more strongly in the Alliance's policy formulation. However, the most important way of strengthening the Alliance would be by increasing their input through co-operation. By creating a European Pillar within the Alliance, they would not only produce a more important contribution, but they would also be able to formulate common points of view. Atlantic Reformism would thus solve two important frustrations within the Alliance:

⁵ Ferdinand Kinski, "A European Defense System: Proposals for Restructuring NATO," in Robert J. Jackson, ed., Continuity of Discord. Crises and Responses in the Atlantic Community (1985): p. 137.

⁶ See above, p. 99.

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the European frustration of too much US leadership and the American frustration about burden-sharing.

Therefore, Atlantic Reformists seek a politically and economically more unified Europe. Military, there should be an intensified co-operation. It does not, however, require a complete political union.

The main issue is in how far the US will accept the Europeans as equal partners and in how far Europeans will effectively increase their contribution. Reforming the Atlantic Alliance implies a great willingness to compromise from both the United States and West Europe.

In its ideal form Atlantic Reformism conceives the Alliance developing from a multilateral collective security system into a basically bilateral relationship between the USA and Western Europe. The few members of NATO who are not members of the EEC together with Canada would be linked to the Alliance by bilateral defense treaties with each partner separately.

The FRG would remain the major European contributor in the Alliance. This would be reflected in the FRG's growing influence in determining NATO's policy. Nevertheless, it would be checked by the other members, especially by the USA.

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EUROPEAN REFORMISM.

European Reformists want to preserve the key elements of the Atlantic Alliance. They are reluctant to make a formal choice between an independent Europe and Atlantic solidarity. An angry rupture would not only upset the ideological, defense and cultural links but also the complex pattern of international corporate investment.⁷

Two assumptions form the basis of European Reformism. Firstly, in a harsher post-Atlantic world, the only way for Western Europe to defend its interests is by evolving into a more self-sufficient international politico-economic power. The heart of European reformism is a strengthening of the Common Market and the institutions of the EEC. National interests would be subordinated to common goals. Secondly, European Reformists expect that Europe will find sufficient areas to compensate for the loss of older industrial sectors. This would provide the foundation of a strong economy.

These two assumptions do indeed allow for a more positive approach to a post-Atlantic order. A United Europe would be strong enough to be treated as an equal partner in

⁷ John Palmer, Europe without America? The Crisis in Atlantic Relations (1987): p. 173.

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any Atlantic relationship. It would also be essential to support international free trade and thus be opposed to protectionism and "Fortress Europe".

On the military side European Reformists do believe in the necessity to plan for an inevitable, at least partial, withdrawal of American troops from Europe. This in turn supports its belief in the need of a greater and better co-ordinated European defense effort. In NATO, purely European agencies would gain greater importance. The US' major role would be the upkeep of global deterrence.⁸

European Reformism would most likely be brought about by a combination of factors: economic growth, loss of confidence in American commitment to Europe coupled with a sustained perception of threat from the East. The FRG, as the leading military and economic power, would have a very important role in this model.

EUROPEAN GAULLISM.

European Gaullism does not exist as such. It is a name given to a particular vision of European integration. It seems a contradiction in terms. It does not reflect De

⁸ Nils Andren, "Continuity and Change: West European Futures," in Jackson, ed., Continuity of Discord: p. 269.

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Gaulle's ideas of a "Europe des Etats." For De Gaulle, a united Europe was a means of raising France's position rather than that of Europe.⁹ European Gaullism borrows its name from the nationalism and independence associated with Gaullism, but transposes them to a supranational European level.

Essentially, European Gaullism pursues complete independence from the superpowers and seeks to exert an important influence in world affairs. It would be a politically united, military independent, self-assertive Europe. In its extreme form European "Gaullism" supports a hawkish independent European foreign and defence policy. It believes in a protectionist "Fortress Europe" and an autonomous European security policy. It would thus not inherit the treaty commitments of the Atlantic Alliance. It wants Europe to develop into a superpower with all the associated paraphernalia, including nuclear weapons.¹⁰

The ultimate aim is not a structure limited only to Western Europe but the unification of the whole of Europe.

⁹ Alistair Buchan, Europe's Future, Europe's Choices (1969): p. 56.

¹⁰ Jan Geert Siccama, "Toward a European Defence Entity," in Jonathan Alford and Kenneth Hunt, eds., Europe in the Western Alliance. Toward a European Defence Entity? (1988): p. 36.

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Therefore, it must co-operate in a way that does not impede the ultimate adhesion of East European states to a European political and economic system.¹¹ As unification of Europe is far from achieved, Western Europe has to lead the way to form the cornerstone of a future larger structure.¹²

European Gaullism is also built on two major assumptions. The Atlantic relationship will develop in such a way that Western Europe and North America will drift further apart in all important fields. It, therefore, attempts to define a clearer and more assertive European identity. The second assumption is that Western Europe is capable through integration to achieve complete autonomy and even take its place alongside the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

Parallel with a greater economic and security independence from the USA, European Gaullists maintain "...resolutely conservative and even militantly Cold War attitudes towards the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact."¹³. This is not contradictory to the idea of Eastern European countries joining a united Europe. This attitude is not

¹¹ Buchan, Europe's Future: p. 57.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Palmer, Europe without America?: p. 179.

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aimed at these countries themselves. It has, however, to be seen in the context of its opposition to both superpowers dominating Europe through their respective military blocs.

The German unification would become a problem of the supranational European government. Germany would, nevertheless, inevitably be the major power in such a federation. However, the USA would not counterbalance Germany within any formal structure.

SOCIALIST NON-ALIGNED EUROPE.

Key ideas of this trend are supported by left minorities within the Socialist parties in Western Europe. This "New Left" assumes a renaissance of socialism. Lately socialist parties have been going through a prolonged crisis in most Western European countries. This has been caused mainly by the disillusion about the performances of Socialist governments throughout Western Europe.¹⁴ However, even if the FRG is still ruled by the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, in 1989 the "SPD (socialist) has returned

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 182.

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from oblivion to become West Germany's most popular party."¹⁵

The revival-also a radicalization-is expected as a reaction against emerging supranational institutions, multinational companies and their lobbying with these institutions. Big business has been increasingly well organized and is taking advantage of the opportunities offered by a uniting Europe. This co-operation between international industry and the European institutions drive the trade unions to more intense international collaboration.¹⁶

Peace movements are stimulating alternative defence policies, basically anti-nuclear and free of the division of Europe into military blocs. The debate focuses on two issues. Firstly, it considers the strategies how to eliminate these blocs and how to achieve a non-aligned Europe. Secondly, it tries to develop an alternative defense posture.

The creation of a non-aligned Europe would be achieved in three steps. The first step would be a nuclear moratorium. The next phase would denuclearize Europe. The

¹⁵ Matthew A. Weiller, "SPD Security Policy," Survival 30 (November/December 1988): pp. 515-528.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 183.

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third step would comprise the dissolution of the blocs. Disarmament would be the ultimate outcome of the process.¹⁷

The "New Left" seeks to reorient European politics by drawing on peace and ecological movements to search for new economic and social policies. It is, however, not able to formulate a realistic alternative for an independent European defense posture.

Some, however, promote replacing a conventional military defense by a system of civil disobedience¹⁸ or by a civilian based system as in Switzerland.¹⁹ The Swiss system could indeed be made to fit into a socialist concept of a people's army. Proponents of civil disobedience believe that it would even work against the Soviets. Nevertheless, it exercises an attraction on a substantial part of the youth and left intellectuals.²⁰

Many ideas of the "New Left have been adopted by socialist parties as they swing more to the left. The security policies outlined at the SPD party congress in 1988

¹⁷ Kinsky, "A European Defense System:" p. 136.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Palmer, Europe without America?: p. 187.

²⁰ Kinsky, "A European Defense System": p. 136.

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reflect most major left leaning trends. They can be summarized as follows:

- * Increased arms control;
- * Structural inability to attack, associated with the SPD parliamentarian Andraes von Bülow, emphasizing reserve forces, reduction of offensive systems, rejection of strategic concepts such as Airland Battle, Airland Battle 2000, "deep strike" and Follow on Forces Attack (FOFA);
- * Weapon Free zones as an intermediate step to total denuclearization;
- * A "New Concept" (Gesamtkonzept) for NATO, replacing Flexible Response because defense based on nuclear weapons has lost public support;
- * "Common Security" (Gemeinsame Sicherheit), emphasizing European self-determination, whereby Europe, free from alliances, would secure peace with and not against its political opponents;
- * Other SPD positions include conversion from military to civilian production and curtailment of arms production.²¹

²¹ Ibid., pp. 516-517.

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However, only a few do realize the costs of such a system and are willing to pay for it.

Alternative models of a non-aligned Europe have existed a long time. Proposals for a Nordic security pattern might serve as a model for a Central Europe, free of military blocs. This Central Europe would be neutral but armed well enough to deter aggressors. Some patterns propose to "Swedenize" the FRG and to "Finlandize" the German Democratic Republic, leaving the BENELUX, France and other East European countries possibly leaning loosely on their respective alliances. Others see a larger neutral Central Europe comprised of the FRG, the GDR while leaving the Finnish role to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and letting France and the BENELUX play the same role as in the previous scenario.²² These models are not, however, based on an integrating Europe.

The influence of the European "New Left" still remains marginal. Their proponents, nevertheless, expect that their ideas could gain a more important following if the current transatlantic crises remains unsolved.

In a socialist non-aligned Europe, Germany would be the dominant power. This would not be a threat as long as

²² Andren, "Continuity and Change": pp. 275-276.

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this Europe would be neutral and peaceful. However, the geographic and strategic position of Central Europe cannot be compared to that of Sweden or Switzerland. Nothing guarantees that it would remain non-aligned.

REACTIONS OF THE USA AND THE USSR TO THE DIFFERENT OPTIONS.

Any evolution in the situation in Western Europe is bound to interest both superpowers. Each would react to and try to prevent an undesirable outcome. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the specific implications of each model on both the transatlantic relationship and on East-West relations.

For the Soviet Union everything revolves around the role of Germany in a future Europe. The USSR would be uncertain about the shape of an emerging integrated Europe and would instinctively oppose it. On the other hand, as long as a unifying Europe would seem to prevent the reunification of Germany, the USSR could gain by it.²³ However, in any scenario the USSR would want to reinforce its ties with its satellites. A possible exception would be

²³ Buchan, Europe's Futures: p. 118.

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the emergence of a non-aligned Europe, but only on condition that the Soviet Union would not perceive it as a pole of attraction for Eastern Europe.

As long as the USA does not feel an urgent need for a stronger political and military ally in Europe, it has most to gain from a continuance of a European dependency. On the other hand, to offset a relative weakening of its power or to concentrate more on other regions, America may feel the need for a military and politically strong Western Europe.²⁴

European Reformism is not the ideal solution for the USA nor for the USSR. It would put the Soviet Union before a difficult choice. Germany, effectively integrated in Western Europe, would have its ambitions absorbed. The USSR could consider this a safer choice than a strong Germany dominating a fragmented Europe. Even if Eastern Germany would join a unified Europe, the national weight of the German state would be subordinated to a larger and moderating influence of the whole.²⁵

²⁴ Ibid., p. 149.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 115.

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Moreover, the links with the US, even if weak, would allow America to exert some restraining leverage. For the United States, this model certainly would mean a substantial loss of influence. On the other hand, if America is drawn to shift its interests to other parts of the world, a sympathetic but strong Europe would be an acceptable option.

European Gaullism, because it is much more extreme, is bound to provoke more outspoken reactions from both superpowers. The hawkish attitude of such a Federation dominated by Germany, would not only make the Soviet Union feel very uncomfortable but also the other East European countries.

One of the conditions for European Gaullism is an independent nuclear force. Because the Western European nuclear force would be much more vulnerable than the American one, the Europeans would be inclined to react without the same restraint. Therefore, Alistair Buchan contends that the countries which would lose the most by the emergence of such a federation, would be the East European states.²⁶ These would be the first targets in any nuclear exchange between Europe and the Warsaw Pact.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 141.

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For the US, European Gaullism would not be an attractive option, because of the loss of allies, of influence and because of Europe's economic policy.

A non-aligned socialist Western Europe would be the most advantageous outcome for the Soviet Union. In European Gaullism, an emerging Europe, actively asserting its independence from both superpowers, confronts both the USA and the USSR. This model on the other hand, considerably strengthens the USSR's position. This is not necessarily because it would take up anti-American positions. It would, however, weaken the American position in Western Europe. Moreover, through its neutral policies it would free Soviet assets in Europe.

Atlantic Reformism would be the most advantageous development for the USA. It would certainly have to give up influence in Alliance affairs. The Americans would, however, demand a heavy price of the Europeans. Again the question arises what might be involved in a more equitable share of the burden.

For the Soviet Union, Atlantic Reformism would pose a double challenge. Firstly, it is the outcome of unsuccessful attempts to split the Alliance and decouple

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America from Western Europe. Secondly, it would complicate decision making. The loss of influence of the USA within NATO is not necessarily to the advantage of the USSR. In contrast to the present situation where the USA virtually takes all initiatives for NATO and the Europeans only react, the USSR would be presented with a second decision center.

Moreover, by assuming responsibility of their security, Europeans expect to restore public consensus.²⁷ This in turn would make it more difficult for the USSR to drive a wedge in the Alliance through propaganda campaigns aimed at the European population.

In Atlantic Reformism, Germany would enhance its influence in Alliance affairs. Its major allies, and in particular the USA would, however, form a counter balance.

CONCLUSION.

Before reaching a conclusion, two observations, based on the preceding analysis, should be emphasized.

Basically only one of these strategies conform with the ideas of a single political family; i.e., that of a non-

²⁷ See above, p. 89.

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aligned socialist Europe.²⁸

On the other hand, an integrated European defense effort is supported by political quarters across the whole political spectrum, be it for different reasons. Atlanticists view it as a prerequisite to a twin-pillar NATO to strengthen the Alliance. European reformists accept the inevitability of a American disengagement from Europe. For European Gaullists, the time has come to gain a independence from the USA and to fully assert European independence. Socialists oppose both NATO and the USA and see an integrated European defense as a way to occupy a neutral position between the two blocks.

The model which reflects most accurately the Western European Union's goals is without any doubt Atlantic Reformism. Nevertheless, an insight into other options, reflecting European integration, is necessary. This examination will help avoid the pitfalls of wishful thinking when drawing the final conclusions in the next chapter.

²⁸ Palmer, Europe without America?: p. 181.

CHAPTER EIGHT.

CONCLUSION.

INTRODUCTION.

Chapter one determined the questions to be answered to satisfy the research question as follows:¹

- * Is the revival of the WEU expected to continue?
- * Does the reactivated WEU dispose of the necessary tools to effectively contribute to the formation of a European Pillar within NATO?
- * Is it likely that the political will of Western Europe to develop a common security dimension will gain enough impetus to effectively define one and carry it out?

¹ See above, p. 14.

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* As the compositions of the WEU, EEC and NATO are not identical, (1) can the WEU speak in name of all European members of NATO and (2) can an Atlanticist security policy be adopted by all members of the EEC?

* Is it likely that in the near future, the WEU's role will be transferred from the WEU to another European or NATO organization?

This last chapter sets out to answer each of these questions. It then puts forward some recommendations, pointing out possible fields for further research. Lastly, it seeks a comprehensive answer to the research question.

QUESTIONS

IS THE REVIVAL OF THE WEU EXPECTED TO CONTINUE?

The Rome Declaration and the subsequent meetings all point decisively at a new interest of the members of the WEU in defining a common approach to a European Security policy.

The success of the WEU's reactivation has stimulated the interest of other countries for this organization. The

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first result was the extension of the WEU to include Spain and Portugal. Greece and Turkey have also expressed interest in joining the WEU.² This demonstrates that more and more European countries recognize the WEU as the most appropriate forum for developing a common European defense policy, at least for the time being.

The WEU has always declared that it does not want to form a "closed club." However, the member states do not want a rapid expansion at the cost of reduced cohesion. Therefore, they have decided to expand progressively, consolidating after each new enlargement.³

NECESSARY TOOLS?

The WEU's structure is in full reorganization. It is, however, hampered by important obstacles. The creation of new organs and procedures requires many adaptations. Nevertheless, once the organizational problems are evened out, the reactivated WEU will be entirely capable of coping with its new roles.

² Jane's Defense Weekly (18 February 1989): p. 257.

³ Alfred Cahen, "De WEU op het Kruispunt van de Europese Constructie," [The WEU on the Crossroads of the European Construction] (1988). Conference held by Ambassador Cahen, Secretary General of the WEU, for "Mars en Mercurius" on 21 October 1988 in Brussels: p.23.

CONCLUSION

The WEU has created a permanent dialogue among its members which should lead to converging positions in defense matters. The permanent organs and the much more frequent meetings between experts of both the ministries of foreign affairs and defense form the basis of a solid exchange of ideas. Through institutionalized meetings, at least twice a year, of the ministers of defense and of foreign affairs, the WEU developed into a real forum to define a common security policy.

ENOUGH IMPETUS?

As mentioned in chapter six the WEU derives its impetus only partly from the crisis the Atlantic relationship is going through. Its awareness that it forms an indispensable element in the integration process of Europe and its clear understanding of its Atlantic origins are the second element of its revival.

The tensions within the Atlantic Alliance and the growing integration within Western Europe have caused the revival of the interests in a common security European policy. However, the new line taken by the new Soviet leadership in its relations with the Western World could create a slowing down of this process. Herein lies perhaps

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one of the greatest challenges to Atlantic solidarity and to European integration in coming years.

WEU AS THE VOICE OF EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS?

The European NATO countries, not member of the WEU, are Greece, Denmark, Turkey, Iceland and Norway. Greece and Turkey have expressed their interest in joining the WEU. However, from the three Scandinavian countries only Denmark is a member of the EEC and inclined to align its policies with those of the Community.

Therefore, the WEU cannot claim to represent all European Members of NATO.

WEU'S POLICY ADOPTED BY ALL EEC MEMBERS?

Even if the WEU does not represent all members of the EEC, its policies could be adopted by all of them, certainly in the long term. Nine of the twelve EEC members are already members of the WEU. Greece, the Irish Republic and Denmark are not .

Greece has applied for membership. In February 1989, Greek officials claimed that their country's anti-nuclear stance should be no worry to the WEU. They underlined that Greece's position on nuclear weapons is not far removed from

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the WEU's policy platform adopted in 1987, endorsing nuclear deterrence.⁴

The neutral Irish Republic has in fact thrown its lot with the West on a "neutrality for reunification" basis.⁵ It is the only neutral member of the EEC. Other European neutrals have declined EEC membership, viewing it as incompatible with neutrality.⁶ Ireland has participated in the European Political Cooperation (EPC) but has not cooperated in defense matters. However, during the CSCE proces, it took part within the EPC expressing a common EEC policy, while the other European neutrals, formed a distinct bloc with the non-aligned states.

Denmark, as member of NATO should have less problems with identifying itself with a common European security policy. It will, however, have to make a distinct choice between Europe and Scandinavia.

All these developments allow us to expect that the reactivation of the WEU will not only be sustained but will also give rise to a larger membership of the organization.

⁴ Jane's Defense Weekly, 18 February 1989: p. 257.

⁵ The following analysis draws heavily on Efraim Karsh, "Between War and Peace: European Neutrality," The World Today 44 (Nov 1988): p. 153-154.

⁶ The other neutral European states are Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland.

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However, to avoid decision-making paralysis, Britain has argued that membership would be restricted to countries which are 'serious' about defense." The current members seem to agree. Therefore, gradualism is more likely than a too rapid expansion.⁷

WEU'S ROLE TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER ORGANIZATION?

The WEU is the only organization outside the framework of NATO to treat Western European defense co-operation. If all European NATO allies join the WEU, this organization can continue as the embodiment of the European Pillar in NATO. If, however, the WEU expands to encompass all members of the EEC, it does not have any reason to subsist as a separate organization and should be reduced to one of the institutions of the European Community.

RECOMMENDATIONS .

This thesis is limited to describing the existing institutions of the WEU, assessing the major players on the

⁷ David Garnham. The Politics of European Defense Cooperation. Germany, France, Britain and America (1988): p. 121-122.

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Western European scene, analyzing the revival of the organization and examining as to how far a revived WEU can effectively contribute to a European pillar in NATO.

It does not propose possible solutions to the restructuring of the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore one of the possibilities for further research is how the institutions involved in the European defense co-operation should be developed. The following possible subjects can be defined:

- * How should the WEU further adapt its organization?
- * If all members of the EEC agree to define a common security policy and the WEU thus becomes absorbed by the European Community, how should defense co-operation be organized within an integrating Europe?
- * How could European countries in the meantime co-operate more closely: e.g., can the example of the French-German brigade be adopted by other European NATO allies?

Another vast field open to further research would be the position of the USA in a NATO organized around two major partners. How would the transatlantic relationship develop if European integration turns out to be successful?

A third field of interest would be the influence of the new Soviet foreign policy on European integration and on transatlantic relations.

CONCLUSION

Another area worth examining is the role of the British and French nuclear deterrent in a common European defense. Is it possible to develop a European deterrent and could it effectively take the place of the US nuclear umbrella in Europe?

CONCLUSION.

This paper set out to answer the following research question: "Does the reactivation of the Western European Union pave the way for a European Pillar within the Atlantic Alliance?"

This questions contains three distinct important elements: "pave the way", "European" Pillar and "Atlantic" Alliance.

The WEU certainly paves the way for a European Pillar. Ambassador Cahen, in his introduction to a WEU pamphlet on the reactivation of the WEU, makes it quite clear that the WEU is not a goal in itself but is filling a major gap in the development towards defense co-operation:

CONCLUSION

Clearly, this should have happened within the framework of the Twelve where a European security dimension should have been developed. But as this is impossible for the time being, another framework had to be found. This framework is the Western European Union whose reactivation⁸ was decided at a very opportune moment[...]

The WEU in no way has the pretension to ultimately be an independent European security organization. It sees itself as an organization which in the long run will allow the European Community to define its own security policy.

The WEU certainly contains the necessary elements of both its European and Atlantic vocation. Three reasons make the WEU the best adapted organization to pave the way for a European Pillar. Firstly, the WEU's two dimensions, as an element of European integration and with its origins in Atlantic solidarity, are without any doubt great assets to fulfill this role. Secondly, its membership is composed of those countries which have recognized the need of a common security policy, both European and Atlantic. Thirdly, the WEU is being expanded only after careful consolidation, giving it the necessary coherence.

⁸ The Reactivation of WEU. Statements and Communiqués. 1984 to 1987. Western European Union (1987): preface.

CONCLUSION

The reactivation of the WEU, just as European integration, may seem a painstakingly slow process.⁹ Many obstructions pave its way. All members do not always have the same objectives, which makes a constant harmonization necessary. The WEU's area of competence is very sensitive because it is identified directly with national sovereignty. Moreover, the WEU, as an organization on the crossroads of European construction and of Atlantic solidarity has constantly to prove itself. On the other hand it has to avoid duplicating European and NATO institutions. A last obstacle consists of the different intensity of the "European Reflex" of each member. Seldom do all members want the same at the same moment.

The reactivation of the WEU is only the first step in a long process of developing a common European security policy in the context of the European Community. The ultimate success of European integration is uncertain. Europe does not exist and perhaps never will. "Europe is merely shorthand for some conglomeration of sovereign states: twelve in the EC and seven in the WEU."¹⁰ However, the objective is identified and the necessary vision has

⁹ This paragraph is based on Cahen, "De WEU op het Kruispunt van de Europese Constructie," p. 13.

¹⁰ David Garnham, op. cit.: p. 179.

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kept the impetus alive. As Jean Monnet wrote in his "Memoires" history often is influenced by ideas:

Those unwilling to undertake anything because they have no guarantee that things will turn out as planned are doomed to paralysis. No one today can predict the shape of the Europe of tomorrow, for it is impossible to foretell what changes will be begotten by change...the path ahead must be opened up day at a time, the most important thing being to have an objective clear enough not to be lost from sight.¹¹

¹¹ Quoted in Western European Union. The Reactivation of WEU.Statements and Communiques, 1984 to 1987, preface.

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